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This study analyzes Thailand's potential as a basing
alternative, assuming the United States is forced to leave
its key facilities in the Philippines. It stresses the US
national interest to maintain a strong presence in
Southeast Asia, and concludes that support of President
Reagan's defense policies infers tacit approval of a Thai
basing scenario. It traces the historic friendship of the
US and Thailand, analyzes the Soviet/Vietnamese threat in
the region and its positive affect on US-Thai relations.
The paper lists and compares Thai and Philippine base
physical assets and missions, and concludes that- while the
Subic/Clark complex can't be duplicated- Thai bases at
Sattahip and Phuket could be used in forward basing
scenarios to maintain the US presence in the region, and
counter Soviet adventurism. If the US stresses the
mutuality of security interests, the Thais will acquiesce
to an American presence. Should the US leave the
Philippines, Thailand is a militarily and politically
viable alternate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corazon Aquino became President of the Republic of the
Philippines in February 1986 and promised a change from
dictatorship to democracy. While Washington welcomes a
return to democracy, having played an important role in the
success of Aquino's "people power" rebellion, a primary
American national interest in the Philippines is
maintaining a strategic military presence at Clark Air
Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.
The Philippine crisis is not over. As one noted
Philippine expert stated, "When they stop dancing in the
streets . . . they've got the same problems." The Aquino
government inherited a collapsed economy, a $30 billion
debt, a corrupt bureaucracy, and an insurgent movement
2
which is ideologically opposed to democracy. Leftist
spokesmen in the Philippines have already criticised Mrs.
Aquino's, "bad positions— leaving the issue of the US
it 3
military bases in the country for the future."
The United States Congress is concerned over the
long-term use of the Philippine bases. In the aftermath of
the Philippine elections, several Congressmen renewed
demands that the Pentagon look for alternative options.
Senator Sasser, ranking Democrat on the Senate
S
Appropriations subcommittee on military construction told
the press the current turmoil in the Philippines demands an
insurance policy of other contingency plans. He said,
We can't assume we'll be able to stay there forever
. . . .
The Pentagon says there is no alternative to
those bases . . . but there's got to be an alternative if
we're told to move out of them.
Philippine instability is a concern to other American
allies in Southeast Asia. The Christian Science Monitor
reported on March 3, 1986,
Some countries, particularly Thailand were also concerned
about how the deteriorating situation in Manila would
affect the United States' strategic presence in the
region, given the key role played by the two US bases in
the Philippines. Debate had even begun in Bangkok over
whether Thailand should allow the US to revive its
military bases on Thai soil if the Philippine facilities
had to be abandoned. But, officially, the Thai ,.
government indicated it was not keen on the idea.
That the Thai government was discussing the issue at
all points to a mutuality of interests between Thailand and
the United States. This paper addresses whether, if the
United States is forced to leave its bases in the
Philippines, we could use Thailand as an alternate. It
examines Thailand's potential as an alternate to the
Philippine bases from a political and military viewpoint,
assuming the United States loses those bases.
A brief look at American national interests in •
Southeast Asia establishes the region's importance. That
importance must be examined in relation to all of Asia.
Southeast Asia links the economic power of Northeast Asia
and the strategic petroleum wealth of Southwest Asia, and
is a growing economic power in its own right.
No examination of American interests in Southeast Asia
can omit discussing the trauma of America's defeat in
Vietnam and its effect on American public opinion. The next
chapter will try to answer the question: Will the American
people support a return of American troops to mainland
Southeast Asia?
Next, the paper provides a brief historical background
of US-Thai relations, tracing the developing friendship
between the two nations, and analyzing their traditional
patron-client relationship. Finally, it reviews the
cooling relationship during the waning years of the Vietnam
conflict .
Then the focus turns to the threat— Soviet and
Vietnamese aggression in the region. This section traces
the Soviet involvement in Indochina and details the Soviet
presence in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. It recounts the Thai
reaction to Soviet and Vietnamese aggression, and its
effect on Thailand's relations with other regional actors.
Finally, it indicates that Soviet presence and Vietnamese
aggression in Indochina led to a convergence of US and Thai
national interests.
Emphasis shifts to a comparison of the Philippine
military facilities and those assets available in Thailand.
The chapter lists the general missions performed by the
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Clark/Subic complex; compares the physical assets in the
Philippines and Thailand; evaluates Thailand's capabilities
to perform the general missions; and identifies Sattahip
and Phuket as possible alternatives.
Chapter VII addresses the politics of negotiations for
US bases in Thailand by stressing that US bases serve the
mutual interests of both countries. It shows that US
basing is a logical progression of security linkages
between the two countries; anticipates possible Thai
reaction to US basing initiatives; examines the benefits to
Thailand of a bases agreement; and predicts the reaction of
other regional actors to a US presence in Thailand.
The paper concludes by predicting the viability of
Thailand as an alternate to the Philippine bases.
11
Chapter I Endnotes
Calvin Denraon quoting Stephen Jurika in "Scramble for
Power Predicted", Monterey Peninsula Herald , February 28,
1986.
From excerpts taken from a lecture given by Dr. Claude
Buss reported in "Observer Talks About Philippines •
Election", Monterey Peninsula Herald , March 6, 1986.
3 Sacerdot, Guy, "The Left Sees Long Terra Gain", Far
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II. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The American press uses "vital," "key," and "strategic"
to describe our bases in the Philippines. The same terms
could describe bases in Thailand. This chapter examines
the economic importance of the ASEAN nations; shows the
linkages of Southeast Asia to the rest of Asia; and
stresses the critical importance of Asia to American
national interests.
It is important to note Thailand's relationship to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN's
importance to the area. ASEAN is nearly synonomous with
Southeast Asia, excluding Burma and Vietnamese Indochina.
ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines, and joined by Brunei in
1984.
It began as an organization to foster economic
cooperation. In 1971, with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration,
ASEAN proposed the neutralization of Southeast Asia by
establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN). The ZOPFAN concept was "the first collective,
indigenous attempt at coping with the impending withdrawal
2
of American military power from South-East Asia."
Since 1979, when it condemned the Vietnamese invasion
of Kampuchea, ASEAN has assumed a respected political voice
13
in the world forum. Lately, ASEAN has begun to cooperate
on some regional military issues, but it is not a
collective security organization.
Thailand is a member of ASEAN, but will be examined
independently. Thus, a reference to "ASEAN's reaction" or
"Thai relations to ASEAN" alludes to a sovereign Thailand
relating to the other nations of Southeast Asia.
The protection of ASEAN is in the American national
interest for its economic strength, as a source of raw
materials, and its strategic location linking Northeast
Asia to the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Western Europe.
Viewed as a political entity, ASEAN has a population
greater than that of the United States and a current GNP of
3
over $225 billion.
Zagoria and Simon give a clear overview of our reasons
for defending ASEAN:
ASEAN is a counter to a Russian-backed expansionist
Vietnam; it is an important trading partner for the
United States, Japan, and other members of the developing
Pacific community; it is a moderate and generally
friendly grouping within the more radical Third World;
its strategic waterways control the access from the
Pacific to the Indian Ocean; it will be, according to at
least one authoritative estimate, the most rapidly
growing region of the world in the 1980s.
The American interest in Southeast Asia is
overwhelmingly economic. American trade with ASEAN is
rapidly increasing, exceeding $25 billion in 1983. US
investments in ASEAN are now almost $8 billion. From
1979-1981, American exports to ASEAN increased by about 30
14
percent and from 1977-1982, total two-way trade more than
doubled. ASEAN is now America's fifth largest trading
partner. United States trade with Asia in 1984 was $174
billion, a 27 percent rise over a 1983 trade of $137
billion. Asia-Pacific commerce represents 32 percent of
all American trade making Asia our largest trading partner.
Asian trade has outpaced US-European trade for the past 13
years. Our economic stakes in ASEAN and the Pacific
7
community are very large.
The ASEAN nations are rich in many of the world's
strategic raw materials and minerals. They produce rubber,
tin, titanium, chromium, and platinum. The US has a net
import reliance of over 50 percent on several minerals
found in the Asia-Pacific region: antimony from the PRC;
bauxite, cadmium, rutile, flourite, and zinc from
Australia; chromium from the Philippines; tantalum from
Malaysia and Thailand; tin from Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia; and tungsten from Thailand and the PRC. This
list of materials suggests, "implications for naval power
and sea control to preserve seaborne traffic in peace and
g
war are clear." ASEAN is also a key source of oil for
East Asia. Indonesia is the world's ninth largest
petroleum producer, and Brunei and Malaysia are also oil
exporters. Southeast Asia mineral exports total $33
9billion each year.
15
Perhaps even more important than its resources or
economic strength is ASEAN's strategic location linking-
Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific region. ASEAN
sits astride the key straits of Makassar, Lombok, Sunda,
and Malacca, (see Figure 1) These straits are the key links
between the economies of East Asian nations and the Persian
Gulf oil that fuels those economies. About 60-65 percent
of the petroleum used by Northeast Asia flows through the
Indian Ocean and the ASEAN straits. Each month, over 4000
\cific Ocecat.
Source: S. Bilveer, "U.S. Military Bases in the Philip-
pines," Asian Defence Journal
,
January 1986, p. 22.
Figure 1- The Key ASEAN Straits
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merchant ships pass through the Strait of Malacca, linking
Asian commerce to the Southwest Pacific, Africa, and
Europe. These shipping lines must be protected in
peacetime and war, since, "Short of war, the interruption
of Western trade patterns could result in widespread
unemployment in the industrialized countries whose
economies are intimately linked to one another."
Viewing the world in US perspective, current policy
places Southeast Asia behind its concerns in Europe, Japan,
and the Persian Gulf. But the ASEAN area is the critical
linkage between these regions. The primary US defense
interest in the region is ensuring secure sea lines of
communication through the Pacific. Secretary of Defense
Weinberger stated, ". . . the security of the United States
has become increasingly interdependent with the security of
1 2
each of its Pacific allies."
Protection of ASEAN, as part of Asia, is in the US
national interest. President Reagan called the Pacific
Basin, the "key to future US interests." His advisors
state that Washington wants to shift its diplomatic focus
from Europe to the Pacific rim because of strategic
a -• 13considerations
.
ASEAN's importance derives from its own economic
strength and links to the other economies of the Pacific
17
security concerns. Our security and defense actions
closely followed economic activity. The 19th Century
"Open Door" foreign policy in China equated to a desire for
equal opportunities vis a vis other Western powers.
History proves that US economic concerns determine our
future strategic interests.
The economic motive of American foreign policy is very
significant ... As the economic dynamism of the
Asia-Pacific region expands in leaps and bounds, the
concept of security will assume a larger economic
dimension propelling active US involvement in South-East
Asia in the decades ahead. US conceptions of regional
security will be informed more by ASEAN as an attractive
economic proposition rather than for its purely strategic
attributes .
Southeast Asia's importance is increasing. It is in
the American national interest to continue our military
presence in the region. If that presence can't be
maintained in the Philippines, it must be located elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. Thailand is the only other country in
the region with long and close historic ties of friendship.
That is why it is the focus of this paper.
18
Chapter II Endnotes
1 Much has been published which tries to describe
exactly what constitutes the American national interest.
Some books and articles attempt to quantify the national
interest. Several key books or articles were reviewed for
guidelines. They are: Friedrich, Carl, J., ed., The Public
Interest , New York, Atherton Press, 1962; "The Quest for an
Operational Definition of the National Interest", an
anonymous, unpublished article; Gabriel, Ralph H., The
Course of American Democratic Thought, New York, Roland
Press, 1956; Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest
,
Glencoe, 111., The Press, 1960; Parrington, Samuel, The
Romantic Revolution: Major Currents in American Thought
,
New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1930. But without
doubt, the best book for use in defining values for
American national security interests is Donald E.
Nuechterlein ' s , National Interests and Presidential




2This guote is taken from a footnote in K.S. Nathan's
article, "US-Thai Relations and ASEAN Security, Australian
Outlook , Vol. 39, No. 2, August 1985, p. 103.
3These statistics were taken from two excellent
articles on the topic with slightly opposing viewpoints.
Richard K. Betts argues that Southeast Asia, while rapidly
developing economically is very low on Washington's
priority list. His article was, "Southeast Asia and U.S.
Global Strategy: Continuing Interests and Shifting
Priorities," in Orbis , Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer, 1985, pp.
351-384. For a security oriented article see former
CINCPAC (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Admiral
William J. Crowe's position in "The US cannot, and should




4 See the chapter written by Donald S. Zagoria and
Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in
Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia , Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1982, pp. 153-173.
See Crowe, "US cannot go it alone", p. 12.
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See Betts, "Southeast Asia", p. 359 quoting from a US
Department of State Bulletin, October 1982, p. 33.
For an excellent account of the threats to America's
Pacific and Indian Ocean naval strategy and the importance
of the strategic sea lines of communication see Dora
Alves', "A strategy for the Indian and Pacific Oceans," in
Pacific Defence Reporter
,
October 1983, pp. 11-16. The
statistics on strategic minerals, and the quote were
reported by Alves on pp. 11-12, referencing the US Bureau
of Mines.
gThe statistics cited are a composite from several
articles. Two have already been noted: Betts, "Southeast
Asia", p. 359; and Crowe, "US cannot go it alone", p. 11.
Two other articles were referenced. See also F. A.
Mediansky's "The Superpowers," Asian Defence Journal
,
January 1985, p. 12, and Ltc Donald Brown, "Don't Give Up On
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Ill OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF VIETNAM
The United States' experience in Vietnam left a
significant mark on the American psyche. Admiral Crowe
remarked, "Following the fall of Vietnam, I ventured the
opinion that we would need at least a quarter of a century
to rebuild confidences shaken by that conflict." Before
defense planners could commit to relocating the Philippine
facilities in Thailand, they must seriously consider
American public opinion about the return of American troops
to mainland Southeast Asia. Ultimately governmental
legitimacy for such a plan springs from American
"grassroots" support. This chapter will show America has
overcome the "Vietnam trauma." Admittedly, predicting
American public opinion is difficult; such analysis is
conjecture, but it must be done.
Four points will be considered in showing public
support for a Thai rebasing concept. Most importantly,
deployment of sailors and airmen to Thai bases is not the
same as committing American soldiers or advisors to combat
operations. Next, American support for a presence in
Southeast Asia can be assumed to be strong, recently
demonstrated by concern over the Philippine election
crisis. Relocating the bases is not just a repackaging of
^
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"containment." World events have shifted US public opinion
into support for Reagan's rearming of America. American
military action does not carry the stigma of Vietnam.
Finally, the United States has a long-standing treaty
commitment to defend Thailand. If forced to honor this
agreement, comparison of South Vietnam in the 60s with
Thailand in the 80s shows the Thai calculus to be very
different .
Probably the strongest argument for a return to
Thailand is that basing troops on foreign soil is not the
same as sending young men into combat. Traditionally,
using airmen and sailors for power projection does not have
the same affect on the American mind as sending infantrymen
into land battle. Since Vietnam, the American public, -
through Congress, has given tacit support for several
military operations.
During American naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra,
off the Libyan coast, in 1981 two Libyan fighters were shot
down by US Navy carrier-based F-14s. Public response was
favorable. The same military "exercises" were conducted in
February and March 1986. 2 On April 14, 1986, US forces
launched a massive airstrike against Libya, with the loss
of one F— 111 and two crewmembers.
During armed reconnaissance flights over Lebanon in
December 1983, two US aircraft were shot down, one pilot
was rescued, one killed, and one captured (later to be
22
freed by the Syrians in a subsequent, much publicized
release). In the same context, the battleship USS New
Jersey delivered repeated artillery barrages into Lebanon,
without arousing significant outcry from the American
public. 3 Since 1980, US AWACS airplanes and KC-135
refueling tankers have flown daily reconnaissance missions
to monitor the Iraq-Iran war for the Saudi Arabian
government, and public opinion remains favorable to such an
operation
.
Clearly, the American public perceives a difference
between open combat and an air force or naval presence.
Hence, American public opinion could be expected to support
rebasing regardless of the mainland Southeast Asian
location.
The American national interest in Southeast Asia has
been examined. The extent to which the American public
believes in those interests will determine support for a
move into Thailand should US forces withdraw from the
Philippines. The Philippine election crisis commanded
great media attention, and most articles or broadcasts
addressed the concern over viability of the US bases.
While most Americans don't know why a Southeast Asia
presence is vital, they know the bases are important.
Public support for American intervention in Philippine
election politics, and Congressional approval of a $900
23
million aid package to the Philippines, infer support of an
4American presence in Southeast Asia.
The Cold War principle of containment is ambiguous,
but Americans understand trade statistics and the need for
raw materials. Since the first oil embargo in 1973, few
Americans argue about protection of sea lanes which secure
access to petroleum. American concern for our continued
military position in the Philippines infers support for an
American presence in Thailand, should Clark and Subic
become untenable.
General support for the Reagan administration's massive
rearmament program also demonstrates a public shift away
from the Vietnam trauma. Since Vietnam, several events
have shocked the public out of its anti-raili tar.y mood: the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the Iranian hostage
crisis in 1980; the atrocities of Kampuchea's communist led
Pol Pot regime; the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea; and
the successful American "liberation" of Grenada.
President Reagan's landslide election of 1980 and relection
in 1984 have been interpreted as a mandate for conservative
opinion
.
Reagan was swept into office on a ticket of "tough big-
stick" diplomacy: this was followed by the passage of
the biggest peacetime military budget by the US Congress.
The military intervention in Grenada was a reflection of
the "hawkish mood" of the Reagan administration. That
Reagan won his reelection in 1984 resoundlingly was a
testimony of the American public's approval and
endorsement of the Administration's foreign and defence
policies .
24
American concern with Southeast Asia has been the focus
of several popular movies; "Rambo" and "Uncommon Valor"
both address the POW/MIA issue.' "The Killing Fields"
portrays the plight of the Kampuchean peoples under Pol
Pot.
Amid a growing mood of frustration and anger caused by
terrorist attacks on the US, extensive Soviet spying on
the country, and what is seen as Soviet expansionism, the
US House of Representatives has overwhelmingly voted for
support to anti-communist rebels around the world,
including US$5 million aid for those in Cambodia
. . . .
This is the first time since the end of the
Indochina war in 1975 that congress has voted for overt
assistance to anti-communist groups fighting Hanoi even
indirectly .... An interesting pointer to the
prevailing mood of machismo on Capitol Hill was the
frequent reference made-,by lawmakers to the screen
character Rambo ....
Douglas Pike notes a change in American public opinion
toward Vietnam and Indochina , • "Antiwar activists, once
monolithically dedicated to embracing Hanoi, split down the
middle after the war, over the human-rights issue in
Q
Vietnam
. • . and over the holocaust ... in Kampuchea."
The overwhelming support for the 1983 invasion of Grenada,
and the April 1986 raid on Libya, prove the American public
will again support the use of force, including the loss of
American lives to protect American interests.
A final point supporting US presence in Thailand is
that any comparison between Thailand in the 80s and Vietnam
of the 60s is misleading. The United States is bound by
9treaty to aid Thailand against foreign aggression. An
American base in Thailand would not affect our treaty
25
commitment, except to decrease response time. If the
United States was forced to honor its commitment to
Thailand, several differences between Thailand and Vietnam
are apparent.
First, Thailand and the United States have a long
history of friendship and cooperation, unlike the US
experience with Vietnam. Next, South Vietnam had no
separate identity as an autonomous state before its
independence, while Thailand has a proud heritage of
several centuries of sovereign monarchy. Finally, the
Thais, as a group, would support a war against communism.
In short, "Thailand represents a better bet as a defensible
nation and far less of a domino than Saigon."
Judging American reaction to reestablishing bases in
Thailand is difficult. However, there are several reasons
to assume the United States is over the trauma of Vietnam.
Four key points can be made for potential American support
for Thai bases:
- An American naval or air facility in Thailand is not a
commitment of soldiers to combat;
- American concern over the Philippine crisis implies
tacit support for an American presence in Southeast
Asia; if not Clark and Subic, then perhaps Thailand;
- The late 1970s saw a return to conservative values in
America. Public support for Reagan's defense policy is
evidence that the "Vietnam trauma" is over;
- Involvement in Thailand is not a repackaging of the
communist containment theory used during Vietnam.
26
The "Vietnam trauma" is over. While Southeast Asia
may not occupy a high place in the American value system,
criticism of possible American involvement in Thailand is
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See the Appendix. Under the 1954 Manila Pact, which
formed SEATO the US pledged to aid Thailand in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Copy of the SEATO
Treaty was published in Collective Defence of Southeast
Asia , by the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 169. The Rusk-Thanat
Agreement reaffirmed this agreement in 1962.
This view of American reinvolvement in Southeast Asia
is presented in Ean Higgins' working paper no. 53 for the
Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Options and
Constraints For U.S. Far Eastern Policy; Five Issue Areas
,
The Australian National University Press, Canberra, June
1982.
The budget issue is significant. It will be the key
to any debate about future American security interests.
Current Congressional debate over aid to the Nicaraguan
rebels (March 1986) makes budgetary issues a major
concern. The budget issue merits a study of its own, and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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IV. HISTORY OF US-THAI RELATIONS 1830-1976
This chapter examines Thai-American relations in three
periods: the 1800s to 1932; 1932 through 1945; and 1945
through 1976; and relates the historical patterns of
interaction to current relations between the two nations.
The first period reflects an emphasis on trade, shows
the great influence of American missionaries and advisors
on Thai leaders, and describes the Thai efforts to become a
modern sovereign state. The second period encompasses
Thailand's overthrow of the absolute monarchy, the break in
Thai relations with the United States during World War II,
and the immediate post-war rapprochement between the two
countries. The final period examines the US and Thailand
client-patron relationship established by the Cold War and
the Vietnam conflict, and the reasons for removal of the
majority of American troops from Thailand in 1976.
(Thailand officially changed its name from Siam in 1939, so
is referred to as Siam for dates prior to 1939.)
A. THE BEGINNNINGS 1830 TO 1932
The roots of American-Thai relations follow a pattern
typical of Western involvement in East and Southeast Asia.
Seafaring traders come in search of wealth, then
missionaries bent on converting the heathen, and finally
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diplomats pursuing the treaties necessary to protect the
interests of the traders and missionaries.
In 1832, President Andrew Jackson sent an intrepid sea
captain, Edmund Roberts, as special envoy to draw up
commercial treaties with Cochin China, Muscat, Japan, and
Siam. The 1833 Roberts treaty with Siam, the first
American treaty with any Asian nation, freed American
merchants of several annoying trade restrictions,
guaranteed religious tolerance, and established the first
2
ties between the US and Thailand. Trade quickly expanded
between the two countries, and the increased contact
naturally led to missionary activity.
If the missionaries came to spread the message of
Christianity, they certainly didn't limit themselves to
preaching. To their credit, American missonaries had a
great influence on Thai health, education, and political
systems. The Rev. Dan Bradley was one of the first
missionaries to work for progress in Siam. In 1835, he
opened the first medical dispensary in Bangkok; in 1844, he
began to publish the Bangkok Calendar
,
Siam's first
newspaper; and in 1848, he helped establish the first
primary school, the initial attempt at an educational
system.
Missionaries provided the most important channel of US
influence through their contact with Siam's royal family.
King Mongkut relied on American missionaries for knowledge
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of Western culture and behavior. This practice led to the
use of American advisors to the Siamese court in later
3years
.
Through the 1840s and 1850s trade between the two
countries increased. During the reign of King Mongkut,
Siam conducted more trade with the US than with any other
nation. In an effort to establish some consistency in
trade patterns with Siam, Townsend Harris negotiated a
treaty with Siam in 1856, which estabished permanent
diplomatic relations, and gave the Americans
extraterritoriality, fixed tariffs, and freedom of
, , . 4
religion
.
During this period, the first patterns of a
patron-client relationship began to develop between Siam
and the United States. During the American Civil War
Mongkut wrote President Lincoln offering war elephants to
help the Union cause. In turn, Mongkut relied on American
advisors and technology to modernize his country, develop
self-reliance, and maintain Siamese independence and
sovereignty. The Thai found the Americans, "... had no
desire for territory in Southeast Asia [and] . . . were
generally more altruistic and humanitarian than the
Europeans
.
During this period, Siam began to use American power as
a counterweight against the Europeans.
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Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn were accomplished artists
in this Thai style of diplomacy, balancing imperial
interests of the French and English against each other
and using their American (or Russian!) friends as
protectors whenever either of the two European powers
became too threatening.
Although diplomatic contact and trade fell off during
the American Civil War, US-Siamese relations were enhanced
during the remainder of the 1800s by an exchange of visits
between the two countries. In 1903, the Siamese began
using an American Harvard law school graduate as an advisor
to the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, a practice which
continued until 1940. Russell Fifield states, "Their
influence at times was considerable on the foreign policy
of the kingdom and noticeable in affecting American
Q
attitudes toward the Thai." Again the Thais used American
patronage to oppose territorial encroachment by the British
and the French.
World War I had an impact on the political fabric of
Siam. Perhaps at the encouragement of their American
advisors, the Siamese joined WWI on the allied side. At
the Paris Peace Conference, Siam, like other Asian states,
matured in the eyes of the West. Shortly after Paris in
1918, Siam joined the League of Nations, as the only
Southeast Asian nation on the council.
In the postwar era, America influence caused subtle but
important changes on Siam. Frances B. Sayre, son-in-law of
President Wilson, became advisor to the Thai ministry and
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pressed immediately for remission of the unequal treaties.
He successfully argued his case in the United States, which
abolished the treaty in 1927. From 1919-1929, the
Rockefeller Foundation was active in Siam initiating public
health programs, funding the studies of Thai students in
America, and founding Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.
American influence didn't change the structure of the
absolute monarchy but did make Thai monarchs more
benevolent. In 1932, King Prajadhipok visited the United
States, and while talking to visiting Thai students, he
allowed them to shake his hand, the first time a Thai
subject had been allowed to touch the monarch. The king and
returning students brought Thailand the concepts of
democracy, equality, and nationalism. Thai society began
to consider governmental reform and a sovereign Siam, free
9
of Western domination. Although there were two
unsuccessful coups in 1912 and 1917, the monarchy remained
absolute until June 24, 1932, when a group led by Pridi
Phanorayong overthrew the king.
During the century from 1830 to 1930, the United States
formed a cordial, if sometimes distant, relationship with
Siam. American opinion supported underdog Siam against the
colonial powers. "The Thai early recognized this
sympathetic attitude and to promote their national interest
they often sought close relations." The Thai repeatedly
demonstrated diplomatic statecraft which promoted
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independence, self-reliance, and the use of American
patronage as a protection against external aggression.
During the next thirteen years, from 1932 to 1945, Thai-US
relations would suffer two complete reversals.
B. DISILLUSION, WAR, RAPPROCHEMENT 1932-1945
From 1932 to 1945, Thai-American relations gradually
deteriorated from friendship to war, only to find immediate
postwar rapprochement. Both countries' foreign policies
served their respective national interests. However, a
unique feature of the relationship was that the friendship
of the two peoples remained strong, while their governments
were at war.
The series of coup groups which succeeded the absolute
monarchy in Thailand were nationalistic and decidedly
anti-foreign. Since America was the primary foreign
influence, the Thai government became indifferent toward
the United States. Lt. Col. Phibun Songhram (in power from
1938 to 1944) led a government dominated by conservative
military officers, and his foreign policy orientation
favored other military-led governments. His philosophy
stood in stark contrast to American democracy, and
Thai-American relations were further estranged.
Phibun and his aides were also influenced by the emerging
military dictatorships in other parts of the world,
especially Japan. To them, totalitarian nations appeared
virile and strong whereas the Western democracies seemed
docile and weak.
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In 1940, Bangkok perceived the impotence of American
power against Japanese regional aggression, and pushed
desperately for neutral status. The Thais thus established
a foreign policy pattern of seeking neutrality when they
doubted the commitment of their American patron. On June
12, 1940, Thailand signed treaties of nonaggression with
France and Great Britain, while simultaneously concluding a
treaty of general friendship with Japan. In July 1941,
President Roosevelt, without Bangkok's knowledge, suggested
the neutralization of Thailand to the Japanese, who evaded
1 2his proposal. On December 8, 1941 Japan occupied
Thailand forcing the Phibun government to sign a military
alliance. Once again, Thailand displayed its diplomatic
flexibility .
The failure of the British and the Americans to provide
military assistance and the overwhelming power of the
Japanese armies convinced Phibun and his aides, that they
had taken the only realistic course of action.
On January 25, 1942, the Thai government declared war
on Great Britain and the United States, in a move to
further placate the Japanese and gain maximum autonomy for
Phibun's regime under Japanese occupation. At this low
point of US-Thai relations, the Thai diplomatic mission in
the United States, "... opened one of the most important
contacts ever made between the two countries."
When Phibun's declaration of war was received in
Washington, the Thai ambassador, Seni Pramoj announced that
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his legation was independent of Phibun's government.
Pramoj personally informed Roosevelt that the declaration
did not represent the will of the Thai people and requested
American assistance to liberate his country. During the
remainder of 1941 and 1942 a contingent of Free Thai
volunteers trained in America under the direction of Dr.
Kenneth Landon of the State Department and Colonel Preston
Goodfellow of the O.S.S.
In the summer of 1943, this trained .cadre of resistance
fighters was sent to Southern China, where they joined
forces with an indigenous Thai underground movement led by
Pridi Phanomyong. Phibun's government was aware of
Pridi's underground but neither supported nor opposed it.
Phibun's regime still continued outward allegiance to Japan
yet, "Under this thin veneer of cordiality, however, the
1 c.
Thai gave little cooperation to Japan's war effort."
On July 25, 1944 the Phibun government toppled. By the
end of World War II, Pridi had formed his own government.
He quickly proclaimed that the declaration of war on the
allies was illegal since it had never been constitutionally
ratified or signed by the regency. In a very shrewd
diplomatic move, Pridi appointed Seni Pramoj, a man
immensely popular in the United States, Premier. Secretary
of State Byrnes claimed that the US viewed Thailand,
"
. . . not as an enemy but as a country to be
liberated." Once again, the Thais demonstrated an
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exceptional diplomatic flexibility to preserve their
independence and serve their national interests.
In the immediate postwar environment Britain and France
pressed for punitive action against Thailand, while the
United States opposed negative sanctions. The Thai
government quietly allowed its American patron to plead its
case. Thailand's postwar reparations amounted to little
more than repudiation of territory seized from the British
and French and a levy of 1.5 million tons of rice to
Britain
.
By January 1946 the United States resumed full
diplomatic relations with Thailand, and attained full
allied support for its entry into the United Nations,
1 8
ending a unique chapter in US-Thai relations. The
diplomatic spectrum had run from indifference, to war, to
rapprochement. Thailand had alternately played Japan and
the United States against each other to emerge postwar as a
fully independent nation, virtually untouched by the
ravages of World War II. Thailand faced the Cold War with
an American patron.
C. COLD WAR TO NIXON DOCTRINE 1945-1976
The relations between the United States and Thailand in
the two decades following World War II were characterized
by growing US economic and military aid to Thailand, US
support for a myriad of Thai governments and, with a few
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exceptions, a harmony of national interests. The
post-Vietnam cooling of relations must be viewed in the
context of diverging national interests.
After the postwar settlements between Thailand and the
allies, the United States concerned itself with the
reconstruction of Europe. While Thailand struggled
unsuccessfully to establish a representative government,
Washington's policy toward Bangkok, "... became less
interested in assisting the evolution of constitutional
democracy and more concerned with opposing the spread of
,.19
communism.
The communist threat served both countries' national
interests. Thailand gained vast amounts of military and
economic aid, amounting to more than $138 million by 1957;
and the US gained a staunch ally in Southeast Asia. In
July 1950, the Thais sent 4000 troops and 40,000 metric
tons of rice to Korea to aid the United Nations' war
effort. This token show of Thai support was a shrewd
diplomatic move by the Phibun government. It gave the U.S.
a propaganda counter to Communist charges that the Korean
conflict was an example of "Western Imperialism"; and
Phibun's authoritarian regime gained popular legitimacy
20because of its increased ties with American democracy.
The 1954 SEAT0 agreement was another example of common
interest. The US containment policy gained legitimacy in
Asia through Thailand's support, while the Thais earned a
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written guarantee of defense against external aggression
21
and a permanent link to U.S. support.
The United States continued to support repressive Thai
military regimes so long as they proclaimed themselves
anti-communist. By the late 1950s, this policy created a
backlash of anti-American feeling in Thailand. The Thais
resented American support of the repressive internal
police. The close association of American military
advisors and the Thai military regime gave the impression
that Americans actually controlled the government. By I960,
the U.S. had provided Thailand with nearly $500 million in
aid, of which only 12 percent was for economic and social
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advancement. The deep American involvement threatened
Thai independence and the Thais reacted, predictably, with
a more neutral foreign policy. An additional source of
disagreement concerned differing perceptions of the
communist threat.
In the Eisenhower administration's final years, America
became decidedly less willing to bear any cost to contain
communism. The Thais began to doubt the sincerity of the
United States commitment to SEATO. "For a time, the
growing concern of the Thai government with the ineffective
action of the US [in Laos] caused it to veer closer toward
23
a neutral foreign policy . . ,
However, during the Kennedy administration, the two
countries' views of the communist threat in Southeast Asia
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converged. In 1962, the Thanat-Rusk agreement (see
Appendix) significantly changed the interpretation of the
SEATO agreement by saying the U.S. would defend Thailand
against Communist aggression without waiting for prior
24
agreement of other members of SEATO. This agreement
achieved immediate and enthusiastic response in
Thailand." In May 1962, Kennedy deployed 4800 troops to
Thailand in an attempt to pressure the government of Laos
into a neutralist regime. The increasing involvement of
the United States in Vietnam played directly into the hands
of the Thai government and they welcomed US troops on their
soil
.
During the next seven years, US military strength in
Thailand grew to a high of 50,000 personnel at seven bases.
Most of this manpower supported US bombing campaigns in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Once again, Thailand acted on
its perception of its national interest.
Presumably, the Thais agreed to accept these bases
because of the deteriorating conditions in Laos and
Vietnam and because Bangkok was granted the right to
restrict use of these facilities to the defense of
Thailand and its vital interests.
From 1969 to 1976, American forces were gradually
withdrawn from Thailand and Vietnam. The deterioration of
relations between the two countries started with the
breakdown of American consensus in the war effort.
"Thailand's leaders became convinced that they were holding
empty promises of American support against communist
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27incursions." Two foreign policy announcements by the
United States directly led to the exp.ulsion of American
forces from Thailand.
The first blow to US-Thai relations came in Guam in
1969, when the Nixon Doctrine proclaimed the American
government no longer viewed the security of Southeast Asia
as among its vital interests. Then, in the Shanghai
Communique of 1972, the US showed that it placed a higher
value on rapprochement with its enemies than protection of
its friends. When the Thais lost confidence in America's
pledge of security they acted to protect their own national
interest, by demanding removal of American forces from
Thailand. 28
The "Mayaguez incident" drove a final divisive wedge
between the US and Thailand. In May 1975, an American
merchant ship, the S.S. Mayaguez was seized by Kampuchean
gunboats. The US promised the Thai government that
American planes and troops based in Thailand would not be
used in a rescue attempt without prior consultation and
permission from Bangkok. In the subsequent rescue of the
Mayaguez, Utapao Air Base was used as a staging base for
aircraft and marines without informing Thailand. This
clear violation of Thai sovereignty left a lasting negative
impression on Thailand. It was the "straw that broke the
camel's back" in security relations between the two
«- • 29countries .
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In the period 1946-1976, Thai foreign policy stressed
independence, self-reliance, and flexibility. US-Thai
relations were closest when both countries perceived the
same interests. When the Thais felt they were being forced
to give up their independence with no corresponding
increase in security, they moved away from the United
States toward neutrality. The United States provided aid
to Thailand, and supported Thai governments only when it
served the American national interest to do so.
This historical examination leads to two conclusions.
First, Thailand and the US have a 150-year history of
friendship. Second, while Thailand's actions vis a vis the
United States have varied during the years, "her first
over-riding concern for the past two centuries has been the
preservation of her national integrity in opposition to
30
encroachments on her territory." Friendship between the
two governments reflects the extent to which they
complement each other's national interests.
If events of the early 70s caused a rift between
Washington and Bangkok, the Soviet involvement in Vietnam
would quickly heal all wounds. Vietnamese aggression in
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V. THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE CONVERGENCE
OF- US-THAI SECURITY INTERESTS
Southeast Asia in the 1980s is both an important arena
for global superpower politics and a potentially explosive
battleground for regional security. Soviet involvement in
the region has grown dramatically since the American
withdrawal from Indochina. The Soviet military presence in
Cam Ranh Bay is a threat to the global strategic interests
of the United States. Soviet military power exercised
through the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is a clear
threat to the regional security of Thailand. However, this
Soviet military presence has been a catalyst for the
convergence of Thai and American national interests.
This chapter traces the development of Soviet influence
in Southeast Asia, outlines Soviet goals and objectives in
the area, and examines the Soviet military presence in Cam
Ranh Bay. Next, it notes Thailand's reaction to the Soviet
threat by observing Thai foreign policy through historical
perspective, examines Thailand's current relations with the
other regional actors, and analyzes the regional threat it
faces from the SRV.
The paper concludes with an assessment of the costs and
benefits to the United States of the Soviet presence in
Vietnam. The Soviet threat in Southeast Asia appears to
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have caused the national security interests of the United
States and Thailand to converge.
A. SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA- BACKWATER TO
BLUE WATER
The Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia seems to
follow Mao's maxim "the enemy retreats, we advance." Three
entries relate Soviet involvement in the region: a
chronological history of Soviet presence from WWII to the
present; Soviet goals and objectives in Southeast Asia; and
an account of the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay and
Danang and the threat they pose.
Moscow's presence in Southeast Asia began with its
support of North Vietnam's war effort against South
Vietnam. In the decade 1969 to 1979, a period roughly
corresponding with President Nixon's announcement of the
Nixon, or Guam, Doctrine and ending with the Vietnamese
invasion of Kampuchea, the Soviets were drawn into the
superpower vaccuum in Indochina created by the American
retreat. Since 1979, the Soviets have demonstrated a
strong, continuing presence in Indochina. They have
clearly become a major regional power.
Early Soviet regional policy was reactive rather than
proactive. Moscow supported Chinese goals, and displayed
little initiative. The Sino-Soviet rift encouraged Moscow
to establish direct links with Hanoi, beginning its own
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influence in Southeast Asia. In 1964, Hanoi shifted its
warfare strategy in South Vietnam from guerilla tactics to
general offensive warfare conducted by regular troops of
the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Hanoi sought Moscow's
support to counter American bombing with anti-aircraft
artillery and surface-to-air missiles. Moscow also pledged
assistance against an American attack on the North. By
1965, the Soviets had formulated specific objectives to
guide their involvement in Indochina.
In the late 1960s the Soviets had three regional
objectives :
- Weaken U.S. presence in Asia by forcing U. S.
withdrawal from Vietnam;
- Support North Vietnam's effort without
jeopardizing US-USSR detente;
- Contain China's regional and global influence.
The Soviet Union increased support to Vietnam from
1965 through 1975. When Saigon fell in 1975, the Soviets
had virtually replaced the United States as superpower
patron on mainland Southeast Asia. In August 1975, Vietnam
signed an economic agreement with the Soviets to coordinate
Vietnam's economic plan. The agreement was little more
than a pledge to establish closer ties of cooperation.
For the next three years, Southeast Asia remained "a
backwater for the Soviet Union, a region in which it had
little influence and one that did not assume a high
2priority in Soviet strategic thinking." In 1978, Soviet
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and Vietnamese national interests began to converge. In
June, the Vietnamese joined the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon), linking their economic fortunes with
those of the Soviet-bloc. On November 3, 1978, the Soviet
Union and Vietnam signed a treaty of Peace and Friendship,
beginning a relationship "born of Soviet opportunism and
3Vietnamese dependency." Both countries achieved specific
goals with this agreement.
The Hanoi government needed military assistance and
superpower backing for its aggression into Kampuchea. With
Moscow's assistance, Vietnam increased its army by nearly
50%, from 615,000 to 900,000. Within the first six months
of 1979, the SRV received about 90,000 tons of material and
weapons from the Soviet Union. The next year, Vietnam
imported over $871 million in arras, either purchased from
4
the Soviets or acquired with their aid.
Hanoi's need for Soviet backing gave Moscow the perfect
avenue to increase its influence in Southeast Asia. Soviet
military advisors in Vietnam increased to between
5000-8000. The Soviet's return for their investment was
Cam Ranh Bay, the warm-water Pacific port sought since the
Chinese expelled them from Port Arthur in 1954. The
Soviets now had a physical presence on mainland Southeast
Asia
.
In December 1978, the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
launched a Soviet-style attack across the Kampuchean
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border. The tank-led infantry quickly drove across the
country to the Thai border. Within days, the PAVN occupied
the country, deposed Pol Pot, and installed Heng Samrin as
the head of a new puppet government. This invasion was
clearly the major event in Southeast Asia since the
withdrawal of the United States.
Southeast Asia is again one of the centers of superpower
contention, which is in turn giving a boost to the forces
of militarism in the region. The Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea is the principal cause of these devel-
opments .
In February 1979, the People's Republic of China
launched a punitive raid across the Vietnamese border to
teach Hanoi a lesson. During this incursion, the Soviets
deployed ten ships to the South China Sea as a warning to
o
China. Although there was no clear winner in this border
war, the conflict had two distinct outcomes. First, it
brought China into open competition for regional domination
with the Soviet Union and the SRV. It also clearly
entrenched Soviet presence and influence in Southeast
9Asia. One final event influenced the present course of
Southeast Asian affairs.
On June 23-24 1980, the Vietnamese crossed into
Thailand in pursuit of rebel Kymer forces. During the Thai
military response several Thai soldiers were killed, and
two Thai aircraft were shot down by Soviet provided
surface-to-air missiles. The Thais requested aid from the
United States. President Carter responded by ordering an
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immediate airlift of arms under the provisions of the
Rusk-Thanat agreement of 1962. (see Appendix) The stage
was set for the current balance of power relationship in
Southeast Asia. The Soviets and Vietnamese stand against
the United States, China, Thailand, and ASEAN.
Aside from sporadic fighting on the Kampuchean border
and occasional Sino-Viet border skirmishes, the situation
in Southeast Asia has not essentially changed since 1980.
The Soviets continued their aid to Vietnam and increased
their strength in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Zagoria and
Simon outline current Soviet goals and objectives in
Southeast Asia:
- to contain Chinese power and influence in the region;
- to weaken American power and to separate the United
States from its allies and friends as part of a
continuing effort to shift the global balance of power
more in the Soviet favor;
- to prevent ASEAN from developing into a pro-Western
bloc with security ties to the West and/or China;
- to help consolidate a group of pro-Soviet communist
states in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and to draw those
states into the Soviet orbit;
- to gain increased and regular access to air and naval
faciities in Vietnam and elsewhere in the region to
facilitate the projection of Soviet power.
The Soviet Union pursues these goals primarily through
Vietnam. By supporting Vietnam's domination of Indochina,
the Soviets encircle China's southern flank, with a PAVN
force of over 1 million. The PAVN, third largest standing
army in the world, also provides a coercive lever to
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threaten mainland Southeast Asia. The massive buildup at
Cam Ranh Bay gives the Soviets a viable bluewater navy in
the South China Sea, capable of power projection, sealane
interdiction, and a second coercive lever over the ASEAN
1 2
nations via "gunboat diplomacy."
In pursuit of these goals, Soviet aid to Vietnam is
enormous. Moscow has written off all Vietnamese debt prior
to 1975. It provided Hanoi with an estimated $5 billion in
arms aid from 1978 to 1984. Some 2,500 Soviet military
advisors are in Vietnam to support this program. Through
1983, the Soviets had also provided over $4 billion in
economic aid to Vietnam. The Vietnamese are dependent on
the Soviet Union for all their oil, 25 - 30% of their rice,
and over 90% of their total imports of all other kinds.
The Soviets are buying Vietnamese friendship at a cost of
13$3 million per day. It is an economic stake that Moscow
will not give up without a struggle. Even in the event of
future problems between Moscow and Hanoi, the Soviet Union
is a major regional power in Southeast Asia.
In the past twenty years, the Soviet Union has
purchased its influence in Southeast Asia through economic
and military assistance to Vietnam. Because of these
efforts, the Soviets view themselves as coequal in the
correlation of forces in Southeast Asia and expect to be
14treated as such. It is their strength in Cam Ranh Bay
and Danang which gives the Soviets confidence in the
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correlation of forces. The Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay
and Danang is the major threat to Western security in
Southeast Asia.
Cam Ranh Bay is the largest Soviet naval forward
deployment base outside the Warsaw Pact. It is important
to the Soviets as a naval resupply port, a communications
center, and an air base for reconnaissance, sealane
interdiction, and strategic bombing. It threatens
Southeast Asia because of current Soviet assets and
capability to rapidly expand forces on short notice.
Cam Ranh Bay evolved from an infrequently used support
facility to a major staging complex for the Soviet Pacific
Ocean Fleet, the largest of its four fleets. At any time,
it is "home port" to between 25 and 30 ships, four to six
submarines, and occasionally the aircraft carrier Minsk.
Since it is 2200 miles from Vladivostock and 3700 miles
from Petropavlovsk, it provides a great advantage in
sailing time for Indian Ocean deployment. It allows the
Soviet surface fleet and submarine forces to avoid the
chokepoints in the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Fleet has been
used twice in the region for a show of force.
The first time was during the Sino-Viet border war
during 1979. In 1980, a task force led by the aircraft
carrier Minsk steamed into the Gulf of Thailand to show
displeasure over Thai Prime Minister Prem's visit to the
PRC. Recent Soviet training exercises in the area have
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focussed on antisea lines of communication and convoy
interdiction
.
The Soviets have added six floating piers at Cam Ranh,
a floating dry dock, and improved petroleum storage
facilities through construction of a permanent fuel reserve
tank with 1.4 million litre capacity. These facilities are
among the largest outside the Soviet Union. They have
added several long-range, high frequency, direction finding
radio sites. The upgraded communications facilities now
allow Soviets to monitor US radio communications from Clark
Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and transmissions to the US
fleet in the Indian Ocean.
But perhaps the most threatening aspect of Soviet
strength in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang is its use to project
naval aviation. Between four and eight TU-142 Bear F and
TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft routinely conduct
maritime surveillance of submarine and surface shipping in
the South China Sea. With an unrefueled range of 8300
kilometers, they can cover all the key straits in the ASEAN
region, parts of the Philippine Sea, and the Pacific Ocean
southeast of Japan, (see Figure 2) The Bears are regularly
deployed on two month rotation from Vladivostock .
Beginning in November 1983, the Soviets deployed up to
ten TU-16/Badger medium range bombers at Cam Ranh. By
1985, the force of Badgers had grown to 16. Variants of
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the Badger at Cam Ranh are capable of nuclear or
conventional strike, electronic countermeasures , and
tanker functions. The 3100 kilometer (Figure 2) unrefueled
combat radius of the 10 strike capable Badgers allow them
to attack all the ASEAN capitals, major straits, Guam,
Trust Territory of the Pacific, and Northern Australia.
Soviet BEAR Operating Area
Soviet Tu-16/BADGER Combat Radius
From Cam Ranh Airfield
Source: Soviet Military Power 1985
, p. 130
Figure 2 Soviet Bear/Badger Operating Areas
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The air defense facilities now include a permanent squadron
of about a dozen MiG-23/Flogger B aircraft to provide
all-weather air defense for Soviet ships and aircraft
operation out of Cam Ranh.
The Soviet naval buildup at Cam Ranh Bay extends the
potential battleground far from Soviet home waters. It
threatens the critical sealines supplying oil to ASEAN,
Japan, and Korea. Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
forces in the Pacific, (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff) Admiral William Crowe claims the greatest concern
about the Soviet's Cam Ranh presence is a support structure
which allows them to expand forces there on very short
notice. He states the Soviet goal in the area is "probably
to politically isolate the region from the U.S. and allied
nations to be able to assert its will throughout the
region." Clearly, an American presence in the area is
vitally important to counter such Soviet action.
The Soviet force at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang at any one
time includes 25 - 30 ships and as many aircraft. This
force threatens regional security of Thailand and ASEAN
through coercion. It threatens global security with
interdiction of sealines of communication. Finally, it is
a major challenge to American presence and influence in
Southeast Asia. Much can be learned by an examination of




B. THAILAND'S REACTION TO THE SOVIET THREAT
The Thais have an historic reputation for being
accommodating and flexible in their foreign policy.
Following the withdrawal of American forces from mainland
Southeast Asia, Bangkok initially attempted to follow a
non-provocative foreign policy. The Thais attempted to
accommodate the policies of their former communist
adversaries: the PRC, Soviet Union, and Vietnam.
Unfortunately, Thailand's best intentions gave way to
the necessity of protecting itself from Vietnamese
invasion. The key events responsible for Thailand's
current alignment with China and the United States were the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, and the Thai-Viet
border skirmishes of 1980.
A balanced foreign policy for Thailand entailed
developing relations with China and the Soviet Union
while inducing the United States to retain an interest in
the area.
Thailand's first initiatives toward this balanced
foreign policy were a series of ministerial visits with
China in 1974. The Thais wanted the Chinese to reduce
their support for Thai insurgency groups. As a measure of
goodwill the Thai National Assembly revoked the ban on
trade with China imposed by Marshall Sarit in 1958.
Kukrit Pramoj became prime minister on March 14, 1975.
Five days later he announced the decision to establish
diplomatic relations with China, and to seek withdrawal of
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American troops within one year. Removal of US troops was
not a precondition for diplomatic relations with the
Chinese, who felt the American forces could serve as a
1
8
check against Soviet presence. Rather, it was a move
toward establishing diplomatic relations with the
Vietnamese
.
In July, Kukrit and President Marcos of the Philippines
agreed to phase out the SEATO agreement because its
existence complicated Thai-Viet negotiations. Diplomatic
relations between Thailand and Vietnam were established on
August 6, 1976, but since animosity within the Thai
government was still high, the actual exchange of Thai-Viet
ambassadors was delayed until December 1977.
Thailand wanted friendship with Moscow without
accepting the Soviet's 1969 collective security proposal.
They also wanted to remain friendly with Beijing.
The Thai leadership sought Soviet protection against
Vietnam without accepting the logic of the collective
security
,
groposal which would have alienated the
Chinese
.
In April 1978, Prime Minister Kriangsak visited Beijing
to meet with Deng Xiaoping. The meeting was the beginning of
what was to be perceived as a Thai-Chinese alignment.
"Convergence of interests against Vietnam ensured the visit
20
was a success 'almost beyond our most optimistic hopes.'"
On the eve of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea,
Thailand had established diplomatic relations with China,
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Vietnam and the Soviet Union while maintaining a neutral
stance on both the Sino-Viet and Sino-Soviet conflicts. The
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea forced the Thais to abandon a
policy of strict non-alignment with China for a closer
21protective relationship. It also brought both superpowers
back into the diplomatic picture in Southeast Asia.
In February 1979, Prime Minister Kriangsak visited
Washington to gain President Carter's assurance of protection
for Thailand from invasion under the provisions of the Manila
Pact. In March, Kriangsak visited Moscow assuring Bangkok's
neutrality in the Kampuchean situation. He, in turn, received
assurance that Vietnam had no plans to attack Thailand.
In June 1980, the Vietnamese crossed the Thai border at
Non Mark Moon and engaged Thai ground and air forces. "The
event showed Thai leaders that they could not rely upon Soviet
22
assurances regarding Vietnam's behavior." The event
signalled the end of Thailand's balanced foreign policy and
solidly aligned the Thais, Chinese, and Americans into an
anti-Soviet bloc in Southeast Asia.
Thai reaction to the Soviet threat in Southeast Asia
initially sought accommodation with every regional actor.
Bangkok felt Thai interests were best protected by neutrality.
But from 1975-1980, the buffer between Thailand and Vietnamese
communism eroded. Thailand is now the "front line" Asian
state against Vietnamese aggression. Realizing that "you
can't please everyone" in its pursuit of security and
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protection, Thailand turned to the Sino-American bloc for
support
.
Southeast Asia is now split into two camps. The Soviets
and Vietnamese are pitted against Thailand, ASEAN, China, and
the United States. Despite minor differances, Thailand shares
remarkably good relations with its allies. Thailand has also
attempted to maintain a dialogue with its adversaries.
C. THAILAND AND THE OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN ACTORS
1 . Thailand and the Peoples Republic of China
Thailand and China are like two traditional
adversaries who "bury the hatchet" to gang up on the
playground bully. The Thais and the Chinese have the same
perspectives against a common enemy— Vietnam. Two historic
rivalries unite the efforts of Thailand and China.
The Hanoi-Beijing clash is rooted in ancient hatred
and the fundamental perceptions of the status of Kampuchea.
The Vietnamese view Kampuchea as being historically in Hanoi's
suzerainty. The Chinese see Kampuchea as an independent
political entity, albeit one which leans decidedly toward
23Beijing in its foreign policy. Thailand and Vietnam have
fought for generations over the borderlands along Kampuchea
and Laos. The effect of these two historic rifts has been a




Thailand gained two benefits from its rapprochement
with China. China is a protector with a demonstrated
willingness to shed blood to defend Thailand; and China has
withdrawn support of communist led insurgencies within
Thailand.
Thailand has benefited from its diplomatic relations with
China. First, the decrease in Chinese assistance to the
CPT . . . has subdued communist terrorism in the country
. . . . Second, the existing Sino-Thai relations have
become the major force in Southeast Asia to check the
increasing Soviet-supported aggressiveness of Vietnam.
This assumption can be substantiated by the outbreak of
violence between China and Vietnam in 1978 and the
Chinese pledge to give its full support to Thailand if it
is attacked by Vietnam.
Currently, Bangkok and Beijing agree on their
Kampuchean policy. Both generally support the total
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, followed by U.N.
supervised elections of candidates from the Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).
The CGDK is composed of three factions: supporters
of Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, led by Khieu Samphan,
and Sonn Sann's forces of the Khmer Peoples National
Liberation Front (KPNLF). The Chinese, while favoring the
Khmer Rouge, support the total resistance movement with
arms and equipment. Bangkok provides sanctuary for
25resistance movements and refugees within its borders.
The Chinese have pledged to defend Thailand and
ASEAN against Vietnam, and have maintained pressure on the
Vietnamese borders. In November 1985, the Chinese gave
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their first military aid grant to Thailand. The aid
package included 130mm artillery pieces and 24 Chinese made
Model 59 battle tanks. Thailand willingly took the aid
from its former communist adversary. Supreme Commander
Arthit answered critics by saying, "he saw nothing wrong in
receiving military aid from friendly countries, be it the
United States or China if the aid has no strings
attached."
Beginning in 1976, the Chinese slowly withdrew
their support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).
Throughout the 60s and 70s, the Voice of People's Thailand
(VOPT), a clandestine radio based in China, repeatedly
broadcast support for patriotic freedom fighters in
Thailand. But in July 1979, the VOPT made its last
transmission, calling for a united struggle against foreign
aggression. The withdrawal of Chinese support has had a
decisive, negative affect on the CPT and other insurgent
27
movements in Thailand.
The Thai-Chinese relationship benefits both
parties. Thailand has been the middleman in the uneasy
relationship between China and ASEAN on the Kampuchean
28issue. Thailand has given the Chinese a voice within
ASEAN and has partially allayed ASEAN fears of Chinese
intentions. Bangkok also tacitly supports the communist
Khmer Rouge resistance movement.
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The PRC protects Thailand from Vietnamese invasion
and severed ties with insurgent movements within Thailand.
This mutually beneficial relationship, is largely a product
of Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression. Another
relationship benefitting from the Sino-Vietnamese threat is
that between Thailand and its non-communist allies within
ASEAN.
2. Thailand and ASEAN
Thailand is both an ASEAN member and a sovereign
actor. The bond between ASEAN members has been strengthed
by the Indochinese threat. Thailand is the "front line"
ASEAN state against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)
and has emerged as an ASEAN leader.
The Vietnamese threat to Thailand was a tremendous
impetus to ASEAN unity. Security cooperation has
significantly increased since the 1978 Vietnamese invasion.
Although ASEAN has avoided multilateral security efforts,
each country seems to be developing regional military
capabilities. Malaysia is even planning an air training
base on the Thai-Malaysian border which could support joint
29
operations. Unification has been a benefit of the
threat
.
The Karapuchean issue politically galvanized ASEAN.
The ASEAN states were leaders in bringing the Kampuchean
problem before the United Nations. Because of their
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united, organized effort, they are recognized as a
political entity. Again, it was the common threat which
raised ASEAN prestige in the world forum.
The ASEAN states are split in their views of China.
While all the states welcome China as Thailand's protector,
Malaysia and Indonesia are suspicious of China's long term
intentions for Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, Thailand,
ASEAN and China have reached a middle ground over the
approach to short term goals in Kampuchea, because they
distrust the Soviet-Vietnamese bloc more than each other.
From ASEAN's point of view, the USSR had lost its
credibility . . . the common policy shared by Moscow and
Hanoi vis a vis the Cambodian problem has not only
increased China's involvement in Thailand but it has also
led to a convergence of policy between the ASEAN states
and China insofar as Cambodia is concerned.
The Soviet-Vietnamese threat forced ASEAN toward
greater unity, politically and militarily. It also allowed
the ASEAN states to compromise their perceptions of
31China. As Thailand draws closer to ASEAN and China, the
relationship has come at the cost of relations with the
Soviets .
3 . Thailand and the Soviet Union
Although Thailand maintains diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, the rapport between the two nations
is strained. Both nations have an "axe to grind" with the
other. Thailand doubts Soviet diplomatic rhetoric. The
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Thais perceive the Soviet regional buildup as a threat to
security. The Soviets criticise the Thais for their stand
on Kampuchea and continued close military cooperation with
the United States.
Thailand no longer believes Soviet promises of
closer, friendlier ties. The Bangkok Post reported in
January 1985, "Thailand has told the Soviet Union it should
show through action rather than empty words that it intends
32
to improve relations between the two countries. Since
the 1980 border incursions, the Thais hold little faith in
Moscow's ability to restrain Vietnamese aggression. In a
1983 diplomatic visit to Thailand, Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kapitsa reportedly offered Moscow's services as a
peacemaker in regional matters. The Thai government
apparently found more rhetoric than substance in his offer.
"A high ranking foreign minister was reported to say, ' unow
can the Soviet Union be a guarantor of peace when it has
not responded to ASEAN's call for a reduction of aid to
Hanoi?'" 33
Soviet use of the carrier task force Minsk near the
Thai port of Sattahip gives the Thais reason to fear the
Soviet military buildup in Cam Ranh Bay. Recently, Bangkok
took further measures to reduce Soviet influence in
Thailand. It prohibited unauthorized Soviet overflight of
Thailand by Aeroflot planes destined for Kampuchea and
Vietnam. In 1983, the Thai government expelled a Soviet
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34trade official for espionage. Soviet-Thai trade declined
by over one-half from 1981^-1983. Clearly Bangkok has
separated itself from the Soviet Union.
Within the discontent, however, is the clear
willingness to recognize that Moscow is a legitimate
regional actor. In July 1985, General Thep, Thai Political
Affairs Director told the Soviet Deputy Director General
for Southeast Asia that, "as a superpower, the Soviet Union
should play an important role in contributing to Southeast
35Asia's peace and stability."
The Soviets have their own complaints against
Thailand. Moscow is critical of the Thai-ASEAN-Chinese
stance on the Kampuchean issue; it condemns Thailand for
tolerating the Kampuchean resistance movement; and it fears
Thailand's growing military cooperation with the United
States. The Soviet press increasingly criticises Thai-US
joint military exercises, the growth of Thai military
capabilities, and the possibility that Thailand may be used
as an American military base for the Rapid Deployment
Force
.
Thai-Soviet relations are strained because of the
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia. These show little sign
of improvement, and serve to drive the Thais into closer
relations with China and the United States.
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4. Thailand and Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea
The relationship between Thailand and Vietnam is
one of historic enmity and occasional open warfare. The
Thai government fears a Vietnamese invasion, opposes the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and has a continuing
border dispute with Vietnam's puppet state Laos,
Regardless of the outcome of border skirmishes,
Thailand has good reason to fear the Vietnamese military
threat. In Kampuchea, the PAVN forces total between
160,000 and 200,000. There are another 40,000 PAVN troops
deployed in Laos. There are nearly 800,000 troops in
Vietnam itself. The Royal Thai Army counter the Vietnamese
37threat with a force of around 163,000 troops.
The Thais and Vietnamese are totally opposed on the
Kampuchean question. The Vietnamese view Kampuchea as part
of a united Indochina under their control. The Thais want
Kampuchea returned to an independent buffer state. There
is no future compromise foreseen between the two countries
on this issue.
Finally, the relationship between Thailand and Laos
is strained. The two countries have fought over their
common border for centuries. The specific disagreement
centers on the location of the watershed between the Menam
Chao Phraya river system and the Mekong. The argument
concerns three villages on the border: Ban Mai, Ban Kang
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and Ban Savang. While the controversy continues, only one
sure method applies to ownership of the disputed
38territory— possesion is "nine-tenths of the law."
The relations between Thailand and Vietnam and its
client states are governed by traditional hatreds and
disputes over controversial borders. Soviet involvement in
Southeast Asia gave aggressive Vietnam the confidence to
turn an old feud into open conflict. The Viet-Thai
relationship is the most volatile regional security issue
in Southeast Asia.
D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET THREAT-
RESURRECTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLICY
When the United States withdrew from mainland Southeast
Asia few policy makers could have predicted that the region
would reemerge as a key policy area within ten years. Yet
the Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh Bay, the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the Vietnamese
incursions into Thailand have brought Southeast Asia
sharply back into the focus of American foreign policy.
While the Soviet presence in Indochina has a cost for
the United States on both global and regional levels it
also has three benefits to US policy. It caused the United
States to recognize Southeast Asia as an important area;
forced the US to reaffirm its commitment to the free
nations of the region; and it drove China, Thailand and the
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its ASEAN allies into a more positive view of the United
States
.
On a global level, the United States is concerned with
the Soviet buildup in Cam Ranh Bay. American military
planners are concerned with countering the Soviet threat,
keeping the sealines of communication open, and preventing
the Soviets from using their navy to apply political
39pressure to the ASEAN nations.
On a regional level, America is tied by treaty and
executive agreement to protecting Thailand from communist
aggression. Recent joint Soviet-Vietnamese amphibious
operations demonstrate a potential threat to other ASEAN
nations. China serves as a deterrent power to Vietnamese
land invasion, but only the United States can provide the
full range of deterrence against Soviet regional
aggression
.
The Soviet presence in Southeast Asia has advantages.
It caused the US to take another look at the importance of
ASEAN. Next, the United States reaffirmed its commitments
to the defense of Southeast Asia. Secretary of State
Schultz told the ASEAN ministers in 1985 that since 1981
the US had greatly strengthened its naval and air presence
in the Pacific.
We have added 15 Perry-class frigates, 8 Spruance-class
destroyers, and 6 Los Angeles-class submarines ... we
have added to our air forces 112 F/A-18s, two squadrons
of F-16s, and 116 new Blackhawk helicopters .... These
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actions demonstrate our intention and our will to remain
of paramount importance to the Pacific.
The recent Philippine elections made American concerns over
the continued use of Clark AFB and Subic Bay naval base
front page news. Clearly, the Soviet threat has renewed
America's commitment to Southeast Asian and the ASEAN
states.
Finally, the previous analysis of Thailand's relations
with other regional actors shows the effect of Soviet
presence on the unification of China, Thailand, and ASEAN
against the Soviet-Viet threat, while strengthening their
ties to the United States. Soviet threat forces the
regional actors to submerge differences and turn toward
United "States assistance.
Soviet intrusion into the region marked a watershed not
just for Thailand but for ASEAN in that it called into
question the region's ability to contain, local conflicts
and to exclude great power intervention.
It would be inaccurate to say the Soviet threat has turned
these nations into a pro-American security alliance, but
they are solidly opposed to Soviet adventurism in Southeast
Asia.
The Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is a threat to
regional security and the strategic balance of power in
Asia. But it provides the United States with a renewed
interest in the region, and our ASEAN allies with a firm
American commitment. Thailand, ASEAN, and China are
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coalescing as a group opposed to Soviet regional
aggression
.
E. THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES—HELLO OLD FRIEND
The growth of Soviet power and influence in the region
had a significant affect on US-Thai relations. Although
the security goals of both countries differ in some
respects, the outcome is the same.
Thailand fears invasion from Vietnam and superpower
intimidation by the Soviet Union. Its primary concern is
survival as a free nation. The United States wants to
counter the growth of Soviet military might in Southeast
Asia. Washington is also committed to defending Thailand
from invasion.
Since 1980, the United States has increased security
assistance to Thailand from $39 million to $107 million,
"indicating that the US placed great importance on its
relations with Thailand and wanted to help modernize the
42Thai armed forces. As a positive demonstration of
American commitment to keep Thailand free from Vietnamese
aggression, the two countries have conducted joint military
exercises each year since 1981.
The Soviet-Vietnamese threat to Southeast Asia renewed
the relationship between Thailand and the United States.
The threat allowed the common national interests of the two
nations to converge.
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Kampuchea enables US-Thai security interests to converge
and, by expansion, promotes a growing identity of
US-ASEAN security interests . . . US-Thai relations will
be constantly governed by the mutual objectives of
preventing the emergence of a power or coalition that can
dominate the region and thereby undermine regional
stability .
It is in the common interests of both countries to keep
Thailand strong, independent, and free.
This chapter had three goals: to trace the rise of
Soviet power and influence in Southeast Asia; to examine
Thailand's reaction to the Soviet threat; and to analyze
the costs and benefits of the Soviet threat in Southeast
Asia on US foreign policy. In the past two decades the
Soviets transformed the PAVN into the third largest force
in the world through massive amounts of military and
economic assistance. In return for this support, they
secured a major military post on the South China Sea. This
bastion challenges US forces in the area, imperils the key
straits and sea lines of communication in the Western
Pacific, and provides a political threat to the ASEAN
nations .
The Soviet threat to Thailand forced the Thais to
abandon a "balanced foreign policy" for one which aligned
itself with China and the United States. However, this
threat fosters increased cooperation between Thailand,
China, and the ASEAN nations.
The Soviet presence in Southeast Asia caused America to
refocus its emphasis on the area, reaffirm it commitments
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to the ASEAN nations, and renew its friendship with
Thailand. While Soviet influence in the region has many
undesirable effects on the free nations of the West, it has
undeniably forced a convergence in the national interests
of the United States and Thailand.
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VI. COMPARING PHYSICAL ASSETS PHILIPPINES VERSUS THAILAND
The American facilities in the Philippinnes are key
components of the US presence in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific, whose loss could severely limit our
ability to project power and counter Soviet adventurism in
the region. No other single base in Asia can duplicate the
Philippine bases combination of strategic location, natural
harbor, ship repair and logistics infrastructure, trained
economical labor force, communications network, and
realistic training sites. Should the US abandon its
Philippine facilities, a US presence in the region will
probably be maintained by projecting force from a
combination of several other sites rather than one central
point
.
This chapter focusses on Thailand's physical assets and
ability to replace some of the missions performed by the
Philippine bases. It analyzes the broad missions performed
by the Philippine facilities, lists the specific assets
available in the Philippines and Thailand, compares and
contrasts the two countries' abilities to perform the




A. MISSION OF THE PHILIPPINE FACILITIES
The Philippine basing facilities are the "Jewels in the
Crown" of America's Pacific bases. They serve a broad
continuing US national interest in the Western Pacific.
The facilities at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and
elsewhere in the Philippines provide a wide variety of
services essential to maintaining the air and naval
missions in the region:
- Provide the US Navy with the best protected, deep water
harbor facilities in Southeast Asia;
- Provide the largest, most cost effective, and efficient
ship repair facilities in the Pacific;
- Provide for comprehensive support for all operating
forces in the area including communication, logistics,
maintenance, training and personnel requirements;
- Provide major war reserve materiel storage for various
contingencies ;
- Provide a central location for rapid response which is
only four flying hours or five sea days from Japan,
Taiwan, Singapore and Guam and eight flying hours or
nine sea days from the US base at Diego Garcia.
The bases are used as platforms from which US forces
can accomplish several missions better than any other
Western Pacific base:
- Provide continuous US air and naval presence in the
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions without having
to return to the US for periodic maintenance;
- Enable US air and naval commands to meet contingencies
outside the Western Pacific region, such as the
Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the Middle East;
- To protect vital air-sea lanes of the Western Pacific
region which are essential for the US and its allies;
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- Form an integral part of a deterrent system that
signals potential adversaries of US resolve to meet its
commitments
;
- Provide a visible manifestation of US power in an area
of growing military and political interest to the
Soviet Union;
- Provide vital worldwide command and control facilities;
- Act as an effective counterbalance in the Western
Pacific and Indian Ocean to the growing military
presence of the Soviet Union and its allies, and help
maintain a balance of power in the region;
- Symbolize American political and military commitments
to the region;
- Provide the regional states "breathing space" and
protection from Soviet military expansion and that of
its aggressive regional ally, Vietnam.
B. US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
The US has two major installations in the Philippines;
Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base, and a number of
smaller ancillary installations. These perform many tasks
in support of the US presence in Southeast Asia.
The Subic complex is the largest naval installation
outside the US and the homeport of the US Seventh Fleet,
comprised of 50 ships, 425 aircraft, and 5000 sailors and
marines. Although only one submarine and one cruiser are
homeported at Subic, all of the Seventh Fleet's ships use
the facilities extensively. It has three major wharves
which can berth every ship type, including the Navy's
largest carriers.
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Subic is invaluable to the Seventh Fleet and its marine
amphibious force readiness, as virtually every aspect of
naval warfare can be exercised in the operating areas
nearby. The Zambales ranges, across Subic Bay, comprise
one of the few areas in the Western Pacific which provide
adequate terrain for amphibious training, ground maneuvers,
and firing live ordnance by ships. Air combat training
facilities are available at Binanga Bay and Tabones.
Subic also has the largest ship repair facilities in
the Western Pacific and performs about 65 percent of ship
repairs for the Seventh Fleet. Its four floating dry docks
can accommodate ships up to 54,000 tons, excepting carriers
and battleships. Its facilities can completely overhaul
most Navy ships and can carry out emergency repairs at sea
or port. The ship repair depot operates continuously, and
its labor costs are the lowest in the Pacific.
Subic is the largest US Naval supply depot outside the
US, with 175,000 square feet of storage space. It
processes over 100,000 requisitions a month. The depot's
freight piers handle about 1,000 container vans per month,
and the fuel department processes over one million barrels
of fuel each month. The fuel storage capacity at Subic is
110 million gallons and is unique in providing a 43 mile,
ten-inch fuel pipeline to Clark. The naval magazine at
Camayan Point encompasses 12,400 acres and can store 46,000
short tons of ammunition.
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Cubi Point Naval Air Station is the Navy's most active
overseas air station, averaging 15,000 landings and
takeoffs per month and accommodating between 150-200
aircraft. It receives 800 tons of air freight and handles
3500 passengers per month. It has a POL storage capacity of
1.68 million gallons, an apron parking area of 313,000
square yards, and can park the entire aircraft complement
of any carrier with room for other operational planes.
Cubi Point is one of only three air stations in the
world where aircraft can be directly off-loaded from the
carrier to the piers. This allows disabled aircraft to be
easily moved ashore for repairs, as well as tailoring an
airwing with the specific aircraft needed for a particular
mission. Cubi Point's maintenance facilities are capable
of depot level aircraft repair.
Cubi Point supports a patrol squadron of P-3 Orion
aircraft conducting anti-submarine warfare patrols over the
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It also hosts a
fleet tactical support squadron which provides on-board
delivery service to the carriers, and a fleet composite
squadron which tows targets for surface and airborne
gunnery exercises.
The Naval Communications station at San Miguel, about
25 miles from Subic is a primary communications station in
the Western Pacific, providing tactical communications
support for Seventh fleet operations and linking the fleet
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to worldwide control facilities. The San Miguel facilities
include two message centers, a microwave relay station, and
a transmitter facility.
The missions performed by the Subic complex are
diverse, unique, and important. The following is a summary
of the Subic Bay facilities:
- 62,00 acres
- Deep water harbor
- 6000 feet dock space on three major wharves
- Ship repair facility (65% of Seventh Fleet Repair)
- Three floating dry docks (54,000 ton capacity)
- Supply depot- 175,000 Sq. ft. storage
- Fuel depot- 110 million gal. capacity
- 43 mi. fuel pipeline to Clark
- 9000 ft. X 200 ft. runway at Cubi Point
- Depot level repair of aircraft at Cubi Point
- Naval magazine, Camayan Point, 12,400 acres, 46,000
tons ammunition storage
- San Miguel Naval Communications center
- 8000 military personnel, 540 US civilians, 5500
dependents, 8500 Filipino employees
2
- 200 bed hospital/Naval Regional Medical Center
Clark Air Force base, 50 miles northwest of Manila, is
the largest US Air Force installation outside the United
States. With a 10,500 X 150 ft. runway, it can be used by
virtually all military aircraft (B-52 emergency only
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because of width). It has 60,000 square yards of parking
space and 79,000 sq. ft. of hangar space.
The major Air Force units located at Clark include the
Third Tactical Fighter Wing, consisting of 48 F-4E Phantom
II's and the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing made up of 16
C-130's and 3 C-9's. The F-4 ' s possess the only permanent
all-weather intercept capability in the Philippines, while
the C-130's and C-9 ' s provide airlift and aeromedical
evacuation capability for the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Other aircraft include 11 F-5E Tiger II "aggressor"
airplanes, 5 T-33A's, 2 CT-39's, and 5 H-3 search and
rescue helicopters.
The Crow Valley weapons range at Clark is vital to the
maintenance of combat readiness of all air units in the
Pacific. The complex contains extensive bombing, gunnery
and electronic warfare ranges, including simulated
surface-to-air installations. These facilities make Clark
the home of "Cope Thunder", the Pacific's version of the
realistic "Red Flag" training program in the US. The
battlefield realism provided through these training
facilities is the best of its kind outside the United
States
.
Clark is also a superb logistic support base. It
provides forward operating locations with major aircraft
maintenance and repair services, including rebuilding
engines and issuing spare parts. It can store 18 million
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gallons of jet fuel and has over a million square feet of
storage area for war readiness material. It can routinely
handle 3,500 tons of cargo and 22,000 passengers daily. It
has the greatest capacity for movement of personnel and
materiel in the Western Pacific and is vital to the
Pacific-Indian Ocean airlift system.
Clark is also the hub of north-south and east-west
communications in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean
region. The facilities include a communications center,
satellite terminal, automatic switching for global voice
and telegraphic service, and high frequency radio
facilities. It supports CINCPAC by providing voice and
teletype alerting networks and airborne command post
support .
Two auxiliary installations contibute to the mission.
At Wallace Air Station, the USAF provides extensive radar
coverage for the defense of the Philippines. It also
conducts tactical air training, provides air-to-air
refueling assistance, and launches and controls target
drones in support of the Pacific Air Force's weapons system
evaluation program. Camp John Hay, in the mountain city of
Baguio, is a rest and recreation center for personnel from
all services which plays an important role in maintaining
3their welfare and morale.
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The facilities at Clark, a vital part of the Pacific
Air Force, may be summarized as follows:
- 10,500 X 150 ft. runway and parallel taxiway
- 60,000 sq. yds. of usable aircraft parking apron
- 79,00 sq. ft. of hangar space
- 370 bed hospi tal/USAF Regional Medical Center
- 48 Homebased F-4E/G's, 11 F-5E's, 5 T-33A's, 2 CT-39's,
16 C-130E/H's, 3 C-9A's, 5 H-3's
4
- Crow Valley target and threat simulation range
The US facilities in the Philippines provide many
important capabilities for American force projection and
stategic defense in Southeast Asia. Their unique location
and combination of assets cannot be duplicated by any other
bases outside the US. However, this paper must now address
what Thai assets might substitute for those in the
Philippines
.
C. PHYSICAL ASSETS IN THAILAND
Most of the military infrastructure in Thailand is a
legacy of American involvement in Vietnam. Thailand has
the most long, hard-surfaced runways in Southeast Asia
Although it has few deep, natural harbors, several have
been used for port calls by the US Navy recently. (See
Figure 3 for an overview of Thailand) None of these
facilities compare to those of the Clark/Subic military
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complex, but they are assets which could be used if
necessary .
Since an airfield is more easily replaced than a port,
this study centers on four areas which could be used by
American naval forces for port call/replenishment in a
forward-based strategy: Bangkok, Sattahip, Songkhla, and
Phuket/Phang Nga. Each area's navigational information,
berthing and facilities, service and logistics, and ability
to accommodate USAF military aircraft, is set forth.
1 . Bangkok/Don Muang
Bangkok is one of Thailand's two major ports. Its
port facilities are located on the Gulf of Thailand, 40 km
(25 mi.) up the Menam Chao Phraya. The river channel is
continually dredged to accommodate ships drawing up to 8.2
m (27 ft.). Ships of up to 172 m in length (565 ft) can
navigate the river and turn without difficulty. Ships
exceeding these limits may anchor 2 mi offshore in depths
of 14m (46 ft.).
Bangkok has adequate berthing facilities,
consisting of seven midstream berths for vessels no more
than 172m (565 ft.) in length. Fuel must be delivered by
barge as there are no pipelines on the pier. The port has
good handling facilities:
- 11 mobile cranes (8-30 ton cap.)
- 12 quay cranes (3-5 ton cap.)
- 2 floating cranes (120 ton and 125 ton cap.)
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- 175 forklift trucks (5,000-7850 lb.)
- 28 towing tractors (8,000-16,000 lb.)
- 3 tugboats (550-1,090 hp)
- 4 rope boats (1,000 hp) 5
American Naval vessels visiting Bangkok estimate
the port capacity to be four DD/FF type ships. The port
has adequate supplies of fuel and water and a good
transportation network of road, rail, and steamer to move
cargo to and from ships. There is one privately owned dry
dock capable of handling ships up to 109 m. (360 ft.) for
minor ship and engine repairs. The port of Bangkok is
being improved. Additionally, the Royal Thai Navy is
constructing another dockyard, Ft. Chula, near Bangkok
which would provide better port facilities for American
Naval vessels.
Bangkok's nearest airfield is Bangkok International
Airport, also known as Don Muang Air Base, located 22.5 km
(14 mi.) north of the city, and headquarters of the Royal
Thai Air Force. It has two runways: 21R/03L which is
12,139 X 197 ft., and 03R/21L which is 9842 X 148 ft. This
airport can handle any US military aircraft loaded to
capacity. It has plentiful support equipment, POL, and
ramp space. While collocation with a civilian field may























The next potential port alternative is Sattahip,
largest Royal Thai Naval Facility outside of Bangkok.
Sattahip (Chuk Samet) is located on the east coast of the
Gulf of Thailand, approximately 180 km (112 mi.) southeast
of Bangkok. The port is encumbered by several reef-fringed
islands within the bay and at the harbor entrance. (See
Figure 4) The harbor is formed by a tanker pier connected
to the shore by a pipeline trestle at the west side of the
entrance and a 1/2 mile-long breakwater extending from Ko
Mu island to protect the pier. A buoyed channel to the
harbor has a measured (USS William Bates) minimum depth of
12.8m (42 ft.). Deep water anchorage is approximately 9
fathoms (54 ft.), and mud and sand provide good holding
ground, but the anchorage is unprotected and chop"py seas
o
occasionally make small boat operations difficult.
The deep water port of Sattahip can handle four
cruisers. It has four 182.9m (600 ft.) berths, but has
none for submarine berthing. Another small coastal harbor
has a pier usable on two sides, one 510m (1,670 ft.) long,
the other 502m (1,50 ft.) long. The port has three cranes
(one automotive, two rail-guided) with a maximum capacity
of 45 tons and no container capability. Three storage
sheds, reported (USS Buchanan) in poor repair, provide an
estimated capacity of 114,450 sq. ft. All POL and water
services are available, some from the pier, most by
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Source: Defense Mapping Agency
Figure 4 The Port of Sattahip
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lighter. Transportation systems at the port of Sattahip are
adequate. Most cargo is transported by road, as there is
9
no rail service to the port area.
Sattahip's nearest airfield is U-Taphao
International, 11.2 km (7 mi.) away. Originally
constructed to handle American B-52's and KC-135's during
Vietnam era, it is perhaps the finest runway and ramp
complex is Southeast Asia. U-Taphao has one runway 18/36,
11,500 X 200 ft., capable of handling any aircraft in the
American inventory. It has a full range of POL services,
support equipment, and a variety of instrument approaches
for all weather operation.
While some of the former American ramp and hangar
facilities are in disrepair, U-Taphao is an excellent
staging base for airlift operations, refueling tankers,
fighter operations, and reconnaissance missions. It is
used occasionally as a refueling stop for US Navy P-3
anti-submarine reconnaissance missions in the Indian Ocean.
3. Songkhla/Hat Yai
Songkhla is on the east coast of the Malay
Peninsula, on the western littoral of the Gulf of Thailand.
(See Figure 5) It is a natural harbor with a narrow
channel which accommodates only vessels of less than 10 ft.
draft. However, because of the gentle slope of the bottom
offshore and relatively shallow depth (less than 20
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fathoms) persisting well into the Gulf of Thailand,
Songkhla could provide anchorage for unlimited ships, at
varying distances from shore. The anchorage is not
sheltered and the nearest major ship would be some four
miles from the beach, six miles from the nearest pier.
Although the Royal Thai Navy maintains two small
piers, they would be unusable by most American naval
vessels. Three steel lighters, each with a capacity of 350
tons, and wooden cargo boats with a total capacity of 1700
tons, are available to load and unload cargo. Songkhla has
no heavy lift facilities, dry dock nor repair facilities,
and has only one storage warehouse of about 6000 sq. ft.
It is served by a two-lane highway and a rail spur via Hat
Yai, which ties into the mainline between Singapore and
Bangkok. The port would require major construction before
it could be used for more than an anchorage for American
vessels
.
Two airfields service the Songkhla area: Songkhla
Royal Thai Naval Airport, 3.2 km (2 mi.); and Hat Yai
International, approximately 32 km (20 mi.). The Songkhla
airfield has one concrete runway 13/31, 4,953 X 148 ft.,
handling small utility aircraft through C-130 cargo planes.
Hat Yai airport has one runway 08/26, 10,006 X 148 ft.,
which supported USAF F-15's and could handle most aircraft
provided its load bearing capacity is determined adequate.
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12
Hat Yai has sufficient ramp space, POL services, and
instrument landing systems to support limited operations.
4. Phuket/Phang Nga
The Phuket Island/Phang Nga region of Thailand is
the only potential port facility facing the Indian
Ocean/Andaman Sea rather than the Gulf of Thailand. (See
Figure 6) Located 390 air miles from Bangkok, Phuket is
both tourist resort and tin mining center. The port is
located on the southeast side of the island, and is fringed
by a reef and several smaller islands. Pa Tong is a
natural bay on the western side of Phuket Island. Phang
Nga is located approximately 30 mi. northeast of Phuket on
the western coast of the Malay peninsula.
Phuket is Thailand's principal tin exporting port,
and has one privately owned pier 62.4m (205 ft) long with
9.6m (31.5 ft.) depth alongside. Anchorage for numerous
deep-draft vessels is available in water 3-5 mi. northeast
of the port up to depths of 15.2m (50 ft.). Phuket harbor
has an adequate supply of POL and water, delivered by small
lighters. One private crane with a 70 ton capacity and a
mobile crane of unknown capacity are available for
offloading cargo. The port can perform minor ship
maintenance. Transportation from Phuket is by highway and
bridge to the mainland, and by cargo ship.
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Figure 6 Phuket
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Pa Tong is a natural bay with depths of up to 20ra
(65 ft.) and a mud/sand bottom which provides excellent
holding. There are no piers, wharves, or services at Pa
Tong, although supplies, fuel, and water can be delivered
by lighter from Phuket. The USS Savannah, on a port visit
in 1983, estimated Pa Tong could accommodate three
13destroyers, but did not recommend carrier operations.
Phang Nga is a Thai naval and airbase being built
with some US government assistance. Although little is
published in open sources about the base, speculation
points to a major staging base for US contingencies in the
Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean. It is also rumored as
14
a site for US prepositioned war supplies.
The major airport serving the region is Phuket
International Airport. It has one runway 09/27 8200 X 148
ft., stressed to handle Royal Thai Airlines Boeing 747's.
Although most USAF aircraft, except B-52's, could use the
field, major construction would be required to lengthen the
runway and add ramp space before it could support extended
a ..15American operations.
D. THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND: A COMPARISON
Thailand's physical assets are inferior to those of the
Clark/Subic complex. It would take substantial time and
money to duplicate the Philippine facilities. In June
1983, Admiral Long, testifying before the House
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Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, estimated the
cost of replacing the Philippine bases at $3 billion to $4
billion. More recent studies place that cost as high as
$10 billion. It is very unlikely that the US Congress
would fund such development. If Thailand's facilities were
to be used as is, or with minimum improvements, some of the
vital missions performed by the Philippine bases could be
accomplished. Table 1 summarizes those general missions,
and compares Thai and Philippine abilities to perform those
tasks
.
If Thailand's bases are used for little more than
limited forward basing and preposit ioned supply depots,
response time to various locations becomes a critical
issue. The Thai locations have an advantage in responding
to the Persian Gulf, while the Philippine locations can
respond more quickly to East and Southeast Asia. However,
if the US leaves the Philippines, it will most likely fall
back to other positions closer to Northeast Asia,
mitigating Thailand's disadvantage. Figure 7 shows the
relative location of various action points, and Table 2
summarizes response times to those points.
The physical assets, maintenance and logistics
infrastructures, and training ranges in the Philippines
eclipse those of Thailand. But potential Thai bases





































































































































Exc.= Excellent ability to perform given mission
Sat.= Satisfactory ability to perform given mission
Marg.= Marginal ability to perform given mission
Insuf. = Insufficient ability to perform given missioni i i ii i du i i iui raisai
* Runways marked can support all US military aircraft,
those marked some can accommodate all but B-52's.
Figure 8 Radius of Action Points for Response Times
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TABLE 2
APPROXIMATE SAILING DISTANCES/TIMES, FLYING DISTANCES/TIMES
To: Pt. A Radius of Action Point Persian Gulf— 15 N. 60 E.
From Sea Dist. Sea Days Fly Dist . Fly Time
(n.mi.) (nearest (n. mi.) (nearest
1/2 day) 1/2 hr.)
Subic 4300 12 4250 14
Sattahip 3800 10 1/2 2750 9
Songkhla 3500 9 1/2 2600 8 1/2
Phuket 2500 7 2400 8
To: Pt. B Radius of Action Point Indian 0cean--Diego Garcia
Subic 3500 9 1/2 3500 11 1/2
Sattahip 3100 8 1/2 2100 7
Songkhla 2800 8 1950 6 1/2
Phuket 1800 - 5 1800 6
To: Pt. C Radius of Action Point S. China Sea— 15 N. 110 E
Subic 500 1 1/2 450 1 1/2
Sattahip 1050 3 1025 3 1/2
Songkhla 850 2 1/2 900 3
Phuket 1650 4 1/2 1050 3 1/2





Sailing time based on 15 knot speed of advance
Flight time based on 300 knot ground speed
For Diego Garcia-- From Sattahip/Songkhla transit Malacca
Strait, Subic transit Sunda Strait
Sattahip and Bangkok are roughly equal in times and
distances
Subic 875 2 1/2 850
Sattahip 2200 6 2150
Songkhla 2000 5 1/2 2050
Phuket 2800 8 2200
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to show resolve, display the American flag, respond to
crises, and counter the Soviet presence. A rebasing
concept using Thailand cannot accomplish the missions of
the Philippine facilities as economically or efficiently.
But if the US must leave the Clark/Subic complex, Thailand
has sufficient physical assets for a forward basing and war
reserve material area.
E. ALTERNATE BASING RECOMMENDATIONS
Two courses are available for a Thai rebasing concept
based on budget considerations. If funding is obtained
for construction, the Phuket/Phang Nga area offers several
advantages. If a minimum cost option must be approached,
the Sat tahip/U-Taphao area provides readily available
assets
.
The Phuket region has several clear basing advantages
over other regions in Thailand. First, the remote location
provides a low-key presence and minimizes anti-American
attitudes in Thailand. Phuket offers immediate access to
the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, and
significantly reduces response time to Diego Garcia and the
Persian Gulf. It offers an excellent refueling stop for
aircraft deploying to the Western Pacific, and is- close
enough to mainland Southeast Asia to deter Soviet and
Vietnamese aggression, yet far enough from the Kampuchean
border to avoid being overrun by a blitzkrieg invasion from
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the SRV. It is close to shipyards in Singapore for major
repairs. These advantages cannot be realized without a
substantial financial investment in airport expansion, and
harbor construction.
Sattahip/U-Taphao provides adequate capabilities with
mimimum investment, and the region has sufficient
anchorage, supplies and storage capability be a forward
base. U-Taphao Air Base is an excellent staging area for
tactical operations, air refueling operations, and
reconnaissance missions. It has several shortcomings:
proximity to the Kumpuchean border makes it hostage to
surprise invasion; proximity to Bangkok subjects it to
potential anti-basing sentiment; and significantly longer
response time to WestPac contigencies .
While Thailand cannot substitute for America's
significant facilities at Clark and Subic, it can provide
anchorage and replenishment areas for the US Navy. It can
also serve to mount aerial operations in the Western
Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. But it can be used by
American forces only if Washington successfully negotiates
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VII. POLITICS OF NEGOTIATIONS
Historically, Thailand and the United States have
cooperated to satisfy mutual needs. If the US must leave
its Philippine facilities, successful negotiations for Thai
basing rights should be governed by mutual interests
between both parties. With perceptions of mutual interest,
negotiations do not present insurmountable barriers.
The American use of Thai military facilities must be
viewed by both countries as the intersection of two
convergent security policies. The United States needs
bases in Thailand to continue an active presence in
Southeast Asia; to protect the sealines of communication
and strategic chokepoints; and to counter Soviet activity
in the region. Thailand needs an American presence to
guarantee its security against Vietnamese invasion, and as
a counterweight to Soviet power in the region.
This chapter addresses American negotiations for Thai
bases by: showing that US basing is a logical and necessary
extension of both countries' security links; anticipating
possible Thai reaction to US basing initiatives; convincing
Thailand of the benefits accruing from the return of US
forces, and countering arguments of a Thai anti-base
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movement; and, finally, anticipating the reactions of other
regional actors.
A. CURRENT US-THAI SECURITY LINKAGE
The Soviet-Vietnamese threat to Thailand caused the US
to reassure its ally by reemphasizing previous security
agreements; to establish new links; and to begin a series
of annual military exercises. A low-key military complex
in Thailand should be viewed as a logical outgrowth of
current security foundations, which satisfies the defense
interests of both parties.
Two agreements provide the foundation of US-Thai
security policy. The first US-Thai link is a resurrected
SEATO Pact treaty commitment: in it, each party pledges to
act to meet the common danger of aggression against the
other parties, within its constitutional processes. A
separate "Understanding" signed by the US further restricts
the threat to "Communist aggression." The 1962 Rusk-Thanat
Communique set forth the security obligations of both
countries under the Manila Pact as individual and
collective. (see Appendix) It is not a tripwire alliance,
but it reinforces Washington's commitment to Bangkok.
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations reassured
Bangkok that Washington would honor this treaty if Thailand
is attacked.
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Since the Vietnamese incursions across the Thai border,
the US and Thailand have increased their security linkages.
The two governments have exchanged a series of high-level
diplomatic visits including visits to Bangkok of Secretary
of State Schultz (July 1985); former Secretary of State
Kissinger (November 1985); Assistant Secretary of State
Wolfowitz (December 1985); and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Armitage (February 1985). In October 1985, Thai
Foreign Minister Sitthi visited Secretary of Defense
Weinberger in New York. This flurry of diplomatic activity
resulted in a logistics Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),
signed by Prime Minister Prem and Secretary Weinberger on 3
October 1985. 2
The document is the culmination of high-level
negotiations between Thai and U.S. officials which began
early this year and is a further development in the ~
35-year old Thai-U.S. military cooperation agreement.
The MoU establishes a framework to give Thailand direct
access to the US logistics system; paves the way for
discussion of a future US war reserves stockpile in the
region; and deals with "defense articles and services" to
4be provided by Thailand to the US. In effect, the MoU
formalises the US guarantee of quick resupply. Although it
forces Thailand to be dependent on US support, one Bangkok
editorial stated, "it is true that in the final analysis
Thailand will have to rely on herself but it is always
helpful to have another arrow in the quiver."
109
Thailand's request for the establishment of a war
reserve stockpile within its borders shows its desire for
increased US involvement in Thailand. The reciprocal
nature of the MoU indicates Bangkok is willing to return
the favor to Washington. The memorandum even references
possible Thai aid to the US in wartime, including refit and
maintenance of US ships and aircraft.
As both governments move toward closer security links,
the next logical extension of cooperation is US use of Thai
bases as part of its forward strategy. US military
equipment would be prepositioned for rapid transfer to
Thailand during emergencies, answering Bangkok's request
for a war reserve stockpile. Washington would gain a
forward deployment area to replace the Philippine
facilities. Clearly, both governments gain mutual benefits
from a basing agreement. Negotiation should emphasize that
US use of Thai facilities is simply the culmination of
increased cooperation efforts by both countries.
B. ANTICIPATING THAI REACTION TO US BASING
The Philippine presidential crisis brought the issue of
US use of Thai bases into the Thai political arena.
Thailand's initial reaction to US basing initiatives would
be negative. An editorial in the Thai press in 1980, after
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea but before Vietnamese
border incursions into Thailand, advised the Thai
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government to be cautious with respect to American
friendship.
Thailand must be careful if it is approached by the
United States. History tells us that too close relations
with anyone can bring only bad consequences. We would
like to say that Thailand is willing to do anything
appropriate in cooperating with friendly countries to
defend our common interests. But we do not want to let
history repeat itself by allowing a foreign military base
to be built in our country.
But the Thais are pragmatists. As the Philippine
crisis intensified, official Thai statements softened.
When asked, in November 1984, about the US use of Thai
bases Interior Minister General Sitthi Chirarot said,
"everyone concerned must look at the issue very thoroughly
if it becomes necessary for the United States to
reestablish its bases in Thailand." Another article in a
Bangkok magazine welcomed increased US-Thai cooperation but
still emphasized caution.
We could say that for Thailand and the United States to
become close allies again is a good thing because it
cannot be denied that having an ally benefits a small
country like Thailand as long as the alliance is based on
equality and care is exercised to ensure that we are not
taken advantage of excessively.
Former Secretary of State Kissinger visited Bangkok in
November 1985, to, among other purposes, poll Thai leaders
on US use of Thai bases. Notable in the report of his
visit was the absence of any rhetoric or admonition for
Thai caution in the matter.
Kissinger
. . . said clearly that the United States will
consult with Thailand if its bases have to be moved out
of the Philippines. Whether or not they will be moved to
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Thailand cannot be overlooked. In any event . . . the
United States is solicting views of Thai people in all
levels about the possible return of U.S. bases to
Thailand.
Thailand's pragmatic opinion has apparently slowly
changed to match political realities. One Thai ministry
source countered criticism that the US-Thai arras stockpile
plan would violate Thai independence and sovereignty with
this realistic appeal,
. . .
[the plan] is nothing we can reject, as there have
already been violations of Thailand's national
sovereignty in which losses of Thai lives and property
were reported. Thailand cannot accept that and must
adopt measures for self-defense .... If others were to
fire on us and we had no weapons, we would die. In a war
situation, therefore, we must have weapons.
Still, the most recent statements of the Thai foreign
ministry indicate the Thais would oppose US basing
initiatives .
Recent discussions in Bangkok about offering a substitute
location for US installations have been rejected as a
political liability. According to Thai Foreign Minister
Siddhi Savetsila: "We want modern weapons, not bases."
The United States must anticipate this reaction from the
Thais and develop a strategy that emphasizes the benefits
to Thailand of an American basing agreement, while
stressing the importance of an American regional presence.
Predicting Thai reaction to US basing initiatives is
difficult. As long as the US presence in the Philippines
appears secure, the Thais will reject the idea of US
facilities in their country. However, if the US is forced
to give up its Philippine bases, Thai opinion might change.
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Given the choice between no US presence in Southeast Asia
and American use of Thai bases, the Thai government would
probably grudgingly acquiesce to American involvement.
C. COSTS AND BENEFITS TO THAILAND
The US can increase the probability of successful
negotiations for Thai basing rights by presenting a
convincing list of benefits to Thailand, while countering
possible anti-basing arguments. Two primary benefits
derive from a US presence in Thailand: increased military
and economic assistance programs which would accompany a
base agreement; and the economic "trickle down" from
employment of Thai labor and infusion of GI dollars.
Conversely, the US must be prepared to counter Thai claims
that the US presence causes a loss of independence and
sovereignty; places Bangkok at risk for nuclear attack;
serves only American national interests, not those of
Thailand; and US troops on Thai soil have a negative impact
on Thai society.
The United States would increase military and economic
aid to Thailand as part of a bases agreement. Americans
have been reluctant to use the word "rent" to describe the
five year, $900 million aid package promised the
Philippines as part of the current bases agreement. US
negotiators should not hesitate to point out to the Thais
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that the US places an economic value on the use of Thai
bases
.
According to Congressional testimony, Thailand must
spend approximately $350 million dollars annually for
military hardware to replace outdated items and to move
forward in weapons procurement. The Thai budget can cover
military capital expenditures of only $200 million. Simple




The Royal Thai Air Force has been forced to rigorous
austerity to purchase 12 F-16A fighters from the United
States .
According to Thai press reports, the Air Force is
implementing a 10% across-the-board spending cut to meet
the expense [of the F-16s], The savings would come from
suspending new recruitment, curtailing pay hikes, and
cutting overseas inspection trips.
A promise of increased aid is a persuasive argument for
those negotiating a US basing agreement, in light of these
fiscal constraints. But military aid is not the only
benefit of US presence.
The aid package signed in conjunction with the
Philippine base agreement called for $475 million of the
14$900 million to be economic aid. Negotiators can stress
to the Thai government that economic aid will increase with
a US basing agreement. This aid not only benefits the
economy, it diffuses the arguments of those who oppose the
strength of the military and its demands on the economy.
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The Thai student movement can be expected to oppose an
American presence in Thailand. If the students felt US
"rent money" could be put to use helping the poor, they
15
might be mollified.
Another benefit from US presence in Thailand is the
economic boost provided by the salaries to Thai laborers,
and the spending habits of servicemen on liberty. One
study of the Phillipines places the annual salaries to
Philippine civilians at $98 million; it claims off-duty
personnel spend $68 million on the local economy.
Considering the costs of local purchase, utilities and
other sources, the study estimates the Philippines gains
$364 million per year above its external aid. While the
value to Thailand of a smaller American contingent might
not approach this figure, it is nonetheless significant.
The United States can expect at least four principal
objections to American basing: infringement on Thai
sovereignty; that the bases serve only US interests; that
the American presence attracts nuclear attack; and that US
troops in Thailand have a negative impact on Thai social
values and customs. Former Philippine Ambassador to the
United States Salvador P. Lopez listed the first three
objections as major reasons for Philippine anti-bases
sentiment. The fourth objection was voiced by the




withdrawal from Thailand in 1976. The infringement of
sovereignty is a critical issue.
Negotiation over sovereignty must stress that the US
has always treated Thailand as an equal and an independent
actor. The Philippine situation is different because it
was a former colony of the United States, and suffers from
a colonial mentality. The American team must point to
England, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Turkey, NATO countries
whose sovereignty and independence does not suffer from an
American presence, and be quick to offer conditions to the
base agreement which place US interests secondary to Thai
sovereignty «,
Many provisions of the 1979 Philippine base agreement
must anchor a US-Thai agreement.
- Acknowledge that the bases are Thai military bases used
by the US; install Thai base commanders.
- Use only enough land and facilities necessary to
perform the mission.
- Fly the Thai flag alone or in a position of honor with
the American flag.
- Designate specific areas for US use, command, and
control .
- Establish a 5-year review process.
- Set forth powers and responsibilities of Thai Base
and American Facility Commanders.
- Establish a Thai role in customs, immigration, and
quarantine procedures.
A strict status of forces agreement subjecting off-duty
American personnel to Thai laws would also allay feelings
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of sovereign infringement. If the US respects Thai
sovereignty from the beginning of negotiations, it may
never become a problem.
Several arguments counter the issue of American bases
serving only US interests. The threat of a Vietnamese
invasion of Thailand may be remote. But, unlike the lack
of any external threat perceived by the Philippines,
Thailand is a "frontline state" facing a clear and present
danger. American facilities in Thailand complicate the
Vietnamese decision to invade. A US presence would serve
as a deterrent even if American troops were not committed
to a "tripwire" agreement.
Thai interests also would be served by using the bases
as war reserve depots. The Thais would get the military
stockpile they seek because American equipment would be
instantly available for transfer to the Thai armed forces.
The presence of an established airlift logistics center
would reduce delays between delivery of supplies and
equipment to the base and their arrival at the front lines
By using a Thai base as a base of operations for inflight
air refueling, USAF aircraft could be deployed directly to
Thailand avoiding time-consuming refueling stops. Should
the Vietnamese commit their forces to an invasion of
Thailand, the early hours of the war would be critical;
fast, efficient resupply best serves Thai interests.
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Another anti-base argument is that an American presence
invites nuclear attack. Because the US must continue its
policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of
nuclear weapons aboard its ships, the Thai facilities could
not be kept a "nuclear free zone." The "nuclear magnet"
argument has some validity, but the issue could be diffused
by locating the American facilities as far as possible from
Bangkok
.
The Bangkok area and lower reaches of the Menam Chao
Phraya valley, like Luzon where the American facilities are
located, contain most of Thailand's population, industry,
and government. A nuclear strike on American bases in
Luzon threatens Philippine survival; a similar strike on
American facilities based near Bangkok would have the same
effect
.
However, by establishing US facilities in remote
locations such as Songkhla, or Phuket Island, any nuclear
attack on these facilities would pose no threat to Bangkok.
This is the best way to alleviate Thai fears of nuclear
war. Initiatives toward a remote American location could
prevent the threat of nuclear attack on Thailand from
becoming a major objection.
The final anti-base objection is the legacy of former
US troops on Thai soil. The American return to Thailand
must stress that any negative impact can be minimized
118
through reduced numbers of troops, remote locations, and
restricted "R&R" visits to Bangkok.
The negative influence of American GIs on foreign soil
has been a problem since the US first sent its troops
abroad. American military personnel in Thailand during the
Vietnam era left images of decadence, drunkeness,
prostitution, and illegitmate children. It led to bitter
complaints by the radical student movement of 1973, which
contributed to the overthrow of the government and ensured
withdrawal of American forces from Thailand.
The radical students also attacked the U.S. presence from
a social and cultural perspective. The arrival of so
many American GIs had corrupted the Thai people, they
felt, infusing Thais with their decadent social values
. . . .
The U.S. presence was identified ... as the
primary cause of "the rotten Thai society in which we are
now living, one with hired wives, prostitutes and half
breed children of all colors."
The impact of American troops in a rebasing scheme
would be less than that of Vietnam through reduced numbers.
At the height the Vietnam conflict, nearly 50,000 US troops
were based in Thailand. Thousands more used Bangkok as an
"R&R" location. As many as 15,000 US service personnel
21
were on leave or duty in Bangkok at any one time. Those
numbers inevitably had a significant impact.
If Thailand becomes a link in a restructured Southeast
Asian presence, US troops could number substantially less
than 10,000. Nearly all the US Air Force needs can be
served by skeleton staff and maintenance organizations and
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flight crews on temporary duty. The Navy needs Thailand
for refueling and replenishment, not "homeporting"
.
Washington can reassure Bangkok that fewer US troops will
not have the same negative impact on Thai society as in the
1970s.
The impact of American forces can also be reduced by
establishing American facilities in remote locations.
Keeping the bases far from Bangkok would reduce their
visibility among the majority of students, bureaucrats and
other informed members of the Thai public. It is American
strategic presence that is needed, not a highly visible
"white fleet." Therefore, the US forces in a remote
location provide what one author has called, "A low-key
approach . . . with* a high profile, and a velvet glove with
b. • i it <- <-lg stick.
Finally, the impact of American GIs could be reduced by
restricting "R&R" and leaves in Bangkok. This might
prevent the resurgence of the enormous strip of bars and
massage parlors that made up the New Phetburi Road district
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of Bangkok in the 70s. Recent studies show the US Navy
is capable of maintaining a lower profile on liberty. The
Navy is making an effort to lower the profile of sailors in
San Diego, one of the largest "homeports" in the world.
"The installations remain but, sailors in uniform seem to
be vanishing from downtown areas, along with the
honky-tonks where so many spent their off-duty hours. ,,24
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Problems of American troops on Thai soil can be minimized
by taking more responsibility for the behavior of our
servicemen
.
Thai reluctance to US basing initiatives can be
overcome only by stressing the benefits to Thailand of a
properly negotiated agreement. Thailand could gain
increases in military and economic assistance and a boost
to its economy from "GI dollars." Emphasizing Thai
sovereignty and mutual interests in the negotiations, the
American negotiators may prevent the major objections of an
anti-bases coalition from becoming insurmountable issues.
The US will gain basing rights in Thailand only if the
Thais perceive benefits to their national interest.
American planners must also anticipate the reactions of the
other regional actors to a US-Thai bases agreement.
D. ANTICIPATING REACTION OF OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS
The last consideration in the politics of negotiation
for American bases in Thailand is the reaction of other
nations to a US presence on mainland Southeast Asia. This
section anticipates the reaction of China, ASEAN, and the
Soviet-Vietnamese bloc to an American base in Thailand.
The People's Republic of China would likely show little
public reaction to a base agreement. The Chinese would
probably neither praise nor corademn the agreement, although
their rhetoric opposes foreign bases on any nation's soil.
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If the Thais support Chinese policies concerning Kampuchea,
the Chinese would privately welcome an American presence in
Thailand as a counterweight to the Soviet bases in Vietnam.
The Chinese have approved US forces in the Philippines for
this reason, and can be assumed to take nearly the same
position with Thailand: ". . . China support[s] the US
military presence in the Philippines . . . because this
presence is seen as the only credible countenance to the
25
expanding Soviet military power."
During the 1983 House hearings concerning the
US-Philippines Bases agreement, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Armitage stated, " . . . having had discussions
with the Chinese, that because of Vietnam's attempt in the
Chinese eyes to flank China, China finds our presence in
the Philippines . . . reassuring." This statement infers
Chinese support for an American basing scenario in
Thailand
.
But both the US and Thailand must realize that China
views itself as a strong regional power. American bases
must avoid competition with Chinese aid to, and influence
in, Thailand, but rather serve to complement it. If the
Chinese sense a decline in their regional influence due to
an overbearing American policy, they may well renew
clandestine support of the Communist Party of Thailand and
withdraw support against Vietnamese invasion. The Chinese
attitude toward American presence would be one of, "Let the
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Americans worry about the Soviets, while we deal with the
Vietnamese .
"
If the Americans can convince the Chinese that they
have no desire to undermine Beijing's policy, the Chinese
will tacitly support a Thai basing scenario. Beijing will
abstain from a public vote on the issue, but the secret
ballot would favor a US presence. The ASEAN position on a
US-Thai basing agreement is similar to the Chinese, but for
slightly different reasons.
Although the ASEAN nations will not give immediate,
unanimous support to a US-Thai basing scenario, they will
eventually acquiesce to a US presence. Initial objections
will be based on doubt over US intentions, the violation of
the ZOPFAN concept, and differing threat perceptions of the
individual ASEAN states.
The ASEAN states may question US interests in the
region. They share a concern with the US over the
expansion of Soviet naval power in the region, but feel
that America is more concerned with countering the Soviet
threat than promoting regional security, "From the
Southeast Asian point of view, the U.S. greatly
over-emphasizes the Soviet threat and attributes far too
much of the responsibility for . . . global troubles to the
USSR." 27
The United States must therefore convince the ASEAN
states that its concern for regional security is paramount.
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It must show that promoting a strong, capitalist Southeast
Asia is a policy goal, not simply a by-product of attempts
at Soviet containment. ASEAN trust in US commitment to the
region will directly affect the reaction to a US-Thai
basing agreement.
The second factor controlling ASEAN reaction is the
regional vision of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN.) Even though Vietnamese dependence on Soviet
assistance and the occupation of Kampuchea have postponed
the idea, ZOPFAN is still an important pipe-dream for
ASEAN. An American force in Thailand, however small, only
delays the hope of a free, non-aligned Southeast Asia.
Malaysia is now the leading ASEAN proponent for declaring
Southeast Asia a nuclear-weapons free zone. The pragmatic
ASEAN nations realize the need for a US presence to balance
Soviet power. "Malaysian officials echoed ... a view
that despite Zopfan, 'the region needed protection [by the
28Western powers] in view of the Soviet build-up.'" Because
the ASEAN states need US protection, they will shelve their
hopes for a neutral zone and tacitly support an American
presence in Thailand. The final barrier preventing
enthusiastic approval by ASEAN is the differing perception
of regional threat between the individual nations.
While all the ASEAN states oppose Soviet power in the
region, and realize the US presence is a necessary
counterweight to Moscow, Malaysia and Indonesia fear the
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power and intentions of China more than any other regional
actor. Both countries had bitter experiences with
Chinese-inspired insurgencies and overseas Chinese
populations. The US involvement in Southeast Asia can
appease ASEAN only by serving as a regional balancer
between China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.
On balance, though, U.S. and ASEAN interests converge
in a compromise status for China: sufficient weakness
to preclude an independent and aggressive military
posture, but sufficient strength to resist Moscow and
inhibit Hanoi.
The United States can contribute to a favorable ASEAN
reaction to a US-Thai basing by being sensitive to the
problems of ASEAN states. Their desire for non-alignment
must be respected, but they will acquiesce to a
Thai-American solution. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew said in December 1985, "If the U.S. has no bases
in Subic Bay or Clark Air Field to balance the Soviet use
of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the security position of the
30Asia-Pacific region would be different."
The other ASEAN nations will also see a US presence in
Thailand as being better than an American force in their
own countries. The initial ASEAN reaction may be guarded
but eventually supportive. The ASEAN position will not
present major problems to American negotiations.
While ideally the ASEAN states would rather be free from
the influence of either superpower, they acknowledge
their dependence on maritime commerce and
highly-competetive international markets and accept that
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only the, United States can counter Soviet aggressiveness
at sea.
Of all the regional actors, the reaction of the
Soviet and Vietnamese bloc is the easiest to predict.
Their reaction will be swift, total condemnation of
American imperialist attempts at hegemony over Southeast
Asia. Both Soviet and Vietnamese rhetoric will focus on
the Thai-US agreement as a threat to the peace of the
region, forever preventing the ASEAN dream of ZOPFAN. The
Vietnamese reaction to joint Thai-US military exercises has
been severe. The Hanoi newspaper, Nhan Dan reported of
"Operation Cobra Gold 85",
The sabre-rattling of the Washington and Bangkok
administrations is ill-timed since some countries in the
region are advocating dialogue and want to solve all
disputes through peaceful means. The U.S. -Thai show of
might has only poisoned the already tense atraoshpere in
the region.
Both Moscow and Hanoi will denounce a
Washington-Bangkok agreement as a real threat to the
region. The Soviets will quickly try to focus on any
negative Chinese or ASEAN reaction, while empahsizing that
their forces in Cam Ranh Bay protect the Vietnamese from
imperialist aggression. Soviet disinformation throughout
East and Southeast Asia would wage unending war on the
US-Thai agreement.
After the October 4, 1985 Memorandum of Understanding
was signed by Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister Prem,
Hanoi charged in an editorial that Washington was using an
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imagined Vietnamese threat as a pretext to further
militarise Thailand; it claimed stores of military
equipment and American collusion with China were the real
threats to regional peace; and it argued that this pact ran
counter to a trend toward peace, stability, and
33
cooperation. The reaction to a US-Thai basing agreement
would be even more vocal and venomous. Despite this
anticipated reaction, it would have little affect on the
success of US-Thai negotiations.
This chapter addressed the problems of negotiations
and stressed the importance of a common perception of
mutual interests. The chapter is speculative, anticipating
the reactions of Thailand and other regional actors to
basing initiatives. But if the United States must give up
its Philippine facilities, Thailand could be convinced to
accept American forces. Thailand must perceive that
economic and military benefits outweigh the infringement on
its sovereignty. While few of the other regional actors
will enthusiastically support a return of American forces
to Thailand, they will all tacitly support a US presence in
the area. Problems of negotiation can be anticipated,
minimized, and overcome. The United States can obtain a
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VIII. Conclusion
This paper examines one critical question. If the
United States must leave its facilities in the Philippines
can we use Thailand as an alternate? The framework for
analysis covered six separate but interlocking subjects:
American interests in Southeast Asia; overcoming the
Vietnam trauma; the history of US-Thai relations; the
Soviet-Vietnamese threat to the region and its affect on
US-Thai relations; and finally, the politics of
negotiations for US basing rights in Thailand.
The reader was first lead to a discussion of the
importance of Southeast Asia to American interests. The
region commands attention as a growing economic power, a
source of strategic raw materials, and as a critical
linkage, via sealines of communication between petroleum
rich Southwest Asia and industrialized East Asia. The free
nations of Southeast Asia, collectively known as the
Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), comprise a
growing economic force. American trade with ASEAN has more
than doubled in the past ten years and shows every
indication of continued rapid growth. America's
Asia-Pacific trade greatly exceeds its trade with Europe.
Although European interests remain foremost in American
priorities, its interests must eventually shift to Asia.
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Southeast Asia is a key source of strategic raw
materials and minerals: rubber, tin, titanium, chromium,
and platinum. Additionally, off-shore oil deposits in the
South China Sea have established the ASEAN nations as a key
source of oil for the industrialized countries of East
Asia. It is in the American national interest to guarantee
access for free nations to these important resources.
Military planners often justify the importance of an
otherwise insignificant area by extollinging its value as a
link between two vital regions. While Southeast Asia is
important in its own right, it also sits astride the key
straits that link oil-rich Southwest Asia and
industrialized Northeast Asia. Over 60% of the petroleum
used by the East Asian economic dynamo flows through the
Indian Ocean and the straits of Makassar, Sunda, Lombok,
and Malacca. An American presence in Southeast Asia is
required to protect these vital sealines of communication.
The focus of the paper shifted to the trauma of Vietnam
to answer the question, "Is America over its Vietnam
trauma?" The consensus is unclear, but several factors
infer American public support for a strong American
presence in the region: US basing is not the same as
committing American troops to land combat; public interest
in the Philippine election crisis indicates the basing
issue concerns many Americans; the massive conservative
support in the election and landslide reelection of
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President Reagan; and finally, US public support of
military actions in the Middle East and Grenada. The solid
public reaction to our Libyan reprisal even' prompted NBC's
Tom Brokaw to ask, "Is America over the trauma of
Vietnam?" The chapter concludes that public opinion over
future US-Thai basing agreements is far more likely to be
concerned with budget considerations than the anti-military
Vietnam legacy.
Next, the paper reviewed US-Thai relations. Two points
emerged from the two countries' interactions: a general
friendship between the benevolent patron, the United
States, and an appreciative client, Thailand; and a strong
tendency for both nations to protect their own vital
interests as they perceive them. Although the US-Thai
relationship has had peaks and valleys, the. two peoples
have a warm regard for each other. While Thailand has
often been willing to rely on US aid and assistance, it has
not hesitated to disassociate itself from American policy
when it felt Thai interests were better served elsewhere.
A history of the two countries emphasizes that future US
initiatives to Thailand must stress mutual interests.
The paper analyzed the Soviet Union's involvement in
Southeast Asia and its affect on US-Thai security
interests. Since the American withdrawal from Southeast
Asia, the Soviets have provided massive military and
economic assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
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In return, the Soviets secured basing rights at the former
US bases of Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. At any one time, some
30 Soviet fighter, reconnaissance, and strike aircraft, and
a like number of surface naval combatants and attack
submarines are stationed at these bases, threatening all
the regional capitals and critical straits.
Thailand's post-Vietnam strategy emphasized neutrality
and accommodation with all regional actors. But Vietnamese
occupation of Kampuchea and armed incursions across the
Thai border forced Bangkok to abandon its balanced foreign
policy and seek protection from China and the United
States. Vietnamese aggression and the Soviet presence in
the region galvanized the resistance of Thailand, China and
ASEAN. Soviet actions in Indochina caused the national
security interests of Thailand and the United States to
converge. Washington wants to counter the Soviet military
presence and prevent a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand.
Bangkok needs American military arms and assistance to
guarantee its survival.
There followed a comparison of the facilities and
missions of American bases in the Philippines and the
capabilities of present assets in Thailand. The Philippine
bases offer an invaluable combination of anchorages,
raaintenace facilities, supply depots, and training ranges
which contribute to a variety of missions. But a limited
forward-based US presence in Thailand would show American
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resolve and commitment to the free nations of Southeast
Asia
.
Four areas in Thailand could be used for an American
base: Bangkok/Don Muang, Sat tahip/U-Taphao , Songkhla/Hat
Yai, and Phuket/Phang Nga. While the Phuket region offers
key advantages in location and force projection, it would
require substantial investment to be an adequate base. The
Sattahip/U-Taphao complex would provide an adequate,
minimum cost basing option.
Successful negotiation for US basing rights in Thailand
must stress mutuality of interests. The United States must
anticipate that Thailand will be unenthusiastic over
American basing initiatives, and quickly point out that an
American military presence is a logical extension of the
recent military cooperation between the two countries. An
American facility in Thailand aids Thailand as a weapons
stockpile, as logistics center for rapid wartime resupply,
and as a deterrent against Vietnamese invasion. Thailand
benefits from increased aid or "rent money", increased
employment, and the domestic trickle down of "GI" dollars.
American negotiators must counter potential Thai anti-bases
arguments, by stressing that through a low key presence,
use of remote locations, and restricted "R&R" visits to
Bangkok we can minimize the negative affect on Thai
sovereignty, nuclear strike vulnerability, and the negative
influence of "GIs" on Thai society.
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In the absence of a US presence in the Philippines, the
Thais will grudingly acquiesce to a limited American
presence in their * country . American basing initiatives
will be quietly and tacitly supported by China as a counter
to the Soviet Union's regional presence. The ASEAN nations
will reluctantly postpone their dream of a non-aligned
region to have an American counter to Soviet and Chinese
influence
.
If the United States is forced to give up its
Philippine facilities, we can expect to successfully
negotiate limited low key basing rights in Thailand by
stressing mutuality of interests. The American public
can recognize the importance of Southeast Asia and our
historical friendship with Thailand. Public opinion will
support rebasing of naval and air force units in Thailand
as a counter to Soviet and Vietnamese presence in the
region. The US could use Thailand as a forward basing
alternative to the Philippines.
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Chapter VII Endnotes





The Thanat-Rusk Agreement of March 1962 ended a period
of strained relations between the United States and
Thailand. American military support for Thailand's
traditional enemy Cambodia, United States ambivalence
toward Laos, and SEATO's refusal to come to Laos'
assistance against the Communist threat had been
particularly divisive problems. The agreement and the
subsequent dispatch of American soldiers to northeast
Thailand once again improved Thai-American relations. The
joint statement altered significantly the original intent
of the SEATO treaty which called for "unanimous agreement"
among the member states before action could be taken
against "the common danger." In the 1962 statement the
United States agreed to defend Thailand without the prior
agreement of the SEATO nations. The Thai reaction to the
Thanat-Rusk Agreement was enthusiastic. Prime Minister
Sarit hailed the American pledge in a special television
report to the people. Thanat Khoraan, Thailand's minister
of foreign affairs, in his statement to the SEATO Council
of Ministers pointed out that
the SEATO alliance was no longer the basis of Thailand's
defense policies. The disinterest of SEATO nations such as
Great Britain, France, and Pakistan could no longer
preclude unilateral American action in defense of Thailand
against Communist aggression.
The Thanat Khoraan-Dean Rusk Agreement [March 6, 1962]
The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoraan, and
the Secretary of State Dean Rusk met on several occasions
during the past few days for discussions on the current
situation in Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asia Collective
Defence Treaty and the security of Thailand.
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United
States regards the preservation of the independence and
integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of
the United States and to world peace. He expressed the
firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its
ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression
and subversion.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State
reviewed the close association of Thailand and the United
States in the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty and
agreed that such association is an effective deterrent to
direct Communist aggression against Thailand. They agreed
that the treaty provides the basis for the signatories
collectively to assist Thailand in case of Communist armed
attack against that country. The Secretary of State
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assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such
aggression, the United States intends to give full effect
to its obligations under the treaty to act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this
obligation of the United States does not depend upon the
prior agreement of all other parties to the treaty, since
this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.
In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggression, the
Secretary of State stated that the United States regards
its commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia
Collective Defence Treaty and under its bilateral economic
and military assistance agreements with Thailand as
providing an important basis for United States actions to
help Thailand meet indirect aggression. In this connection
the Secretary reviewed with the Foreign Minister the
actions being taken by the United States to assist the
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The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State
reviewed the mutaul efforts of their governments to
increase the capabilities and readiness of the Thai armed
forces to defend the Kingdom. They noted also that the
United States is making a significant contribution to this
effort and that the United States intends to accelerate
future deliveries to the greatest extent possible. The
Secretary and Foreign Minister also took note of the work
of the joint Thai-United States committee which has been
extablished in Bangkok to assure effective cooperation in
social, economic and military measures to increase
Thailand's national capabilities. They agreed that this
joint committee and its sub-committees should continue to
work towards the most effective utilization of Thailand's
resources and thsoe provided by the United States to
promote Thailand's development and security. The Foreign
Minister and the Secretary were in full agreement that
continued economic and social progress is essential to the
stability of Thailand. They reciewed Thailand's impressive
economic and social progress and the Thai government's
plans to accelerate development, particularly Thailand's
continuing determination fully to utilize its own resources
in moving towards its development goals.
ister assureD the Secretary of State of
f the government of Thailand to meet
rect aggression by pursuing vigorously
onomic and social welfare and the safety
n Laos was reviewed in detail and full
d on the necessity for the stability of
chieving a free, independent and truly
140
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State also
discussed the desirability of an early conclusion of a
treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the
two countries which would bring into accord with current
conditions the existing treaty of 1937. [1]
Smith, Roger M. ed. Southeast Asia Documents of Political
Development and Change . Cornell University Press, Ithaca
and London. 1974. pp. 74-75.
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